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4 
Abstract  
 
This report analyses the differential impact of extreme weather events in the presence of 
social inequalities. It hypothesizes that social inequalities affect vulnerability and 
resilience through its impact on the capacity to cope and empirically analyses the 
differential impact of extreme weather events in the presence of social inequalities. To 
sidestep the methodological difficulties of quantifying vulnerability or resilience, the 
relation between different inequalities and disaster fatalities are established. The death 
toll from a given disaster is a function of hazard, exposure and vulnerability and 
everything else constant, more casualties imply higher levels of vulnerability. The results 
establish that countries with more equality in gender issues and the distribution of 
incomes on average face lower fatalities when climate related extreme weather events 
strike. While this holds for all measures of the income distribution employed, for gender 
equality this relation can be established for some but not for all proxies used to measure 
the phenomenon. The relation is valid and robust for female to male enrolment ratios in 
secondary education, female labour force participation and to some degree for female 
members of parliament. A statistical relation between more gender and/or income 
equality associated with a reduction in the probability of high numbers of disaster 
fatalities provides indirect evidence for a reduction in vulnerability. But what is the 
underlying mechanism, i.e. why should inequality increase vulnerability or decrease 
system resilience? The report proposes a sketch of a theory as input for future research, 
relating inequality to trust and cooperation as important building blocks for societies’ 
capacity to cope and resilience.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Anthropogenic climate change (CC) contributes to increases in mean temperatures and 
weather variability. Changing precipitation patterns and more frequent and more severe 
extreme weather events are the result. The impact of a given hazard on exposed entities 
depends on their vulnerability and resilience (IPCC 2012, 2014). We hypothesize that 
social inequalities affect vulnerability and resilience through its impact on the capacity to 
cope and empirically analyse the differential impact of extreme weather events in the 
presence of social inequalities. To sidestep the methodological difficulties of quantifying 
vulnerability or resilience, the relation between different inequalities and disaster 
fatalities are established. The death toll from a given disaster is a function of hazard, 
exposure and vulnerability and everything else constant, more casualties imply higher 
levels of vulnerability.  
The results establish that countries with more equality in gender issues and the 
distribution of incomes on average face lower fatalities when climate related extreme 
weather events strike. While this holds for all measures of the income distribution 
employed, for gender equality this relation can be established for some but not for all 
proxies used to measure the phenomenon. The relation is valid and robust for female to 
male enrolment ratios in secondary education, female labour force participation and to 
some degree for female members of parliament 
There is a considerable and growing literature on the economic impacts of natural 
disasters and extreme weather events on the macro- as well as on the microeconomic 
level. On the macro level a large number of studies focus on the effect of natural 
disasters on growth and the relation between economic development and the economic 
costs of respective disasters. Some studies restrict their attention to specific disaster-
types, others evaluate all types of disasters. On the micro level the perspective is mostly 
restricted to specific disaster types or individual disasters and their impacts on 
households with an analysis of individual determinants of vulnerability and individual 
adaptive strategies employed.  
There are a number of reviews that allow for a quick overview over the ongoing debates: 
Lazzaroni and van Bergeijk (2014) give an overview over different themes and provide a 
meta-analysis of the macro-economic literature on economic costs of natural disasters. 
Kousky (2014) discusses the literature with an emphasis on adaptation, restricting her 
review on publications that consider economic impacts of hydro-meteorological disasters. 
Mochizuki et al. (2014) provide an overview over the contributions and problems 
associated with the debate around disaster losses and development.  
Cavello and Noy (2010) provide a review of the first generation of this literature. In 
general, natural disasters and extreme weather events are found to have a negative 
effect on short and long-term growth. However, for some sectors and some types of 
disaster events there is a positive association (e.g. floods sometimes have a positive 
effect on agriculture). Also see Felbermayer and Gröschl (2014), Cavallo et al. (2013), 
Loayza et al. (2012), Fomby et al. (2013), Raddatz (2009), Noy (2009), Klomp and 
Valckx (2014) and Hsiang and Jina (2014). 
Dell et al. (2014) deliver a comprehensive review over the whole “New Climate Economy 
Literature”. After summing up the related methodological issues, they categorize the 
economic literature on weather and climate along the dependent variables considered: 
aggregate output, agriculture, labour productivity, industrial and service-output, health 
and mortality, energy, conflict and political stability, crime, trade and finally, innovation. 
Climate change effects on poverty also receive considerable attention in the literature. A 
literature review is provided by Leichenko and Silva (2014). Climate change is seen to 
affect poverty by influencing prices, assets, opportunities and productivity and is 
generally understood to put additional strains on the task of poverty eradication (or 
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reduction). However, efforts to fight poverty are complementary to efforts of adaptation 
and mitigation of climate change (Hallegatte et al. 2014, Skoufias 2012).  
A few contributions look at the effect of natural disasters and extreme weather events on 
the distribution of incomes. Miljkovic and Miljkovic (2014) show that on a state level in 
the U.S. more damages from hurricanes are associated with a stronger concentration of 
incomes. Silva et al. (2015) show that extreme weather events in Mozambique tend to 
exacerbate existing income inequalities and social divisions in most, but not all exposed 
regions.  
Other publications differentiate disaster impacts along socio-economic and gender-lines. 
Neumayer and Plümper (2007) show that the decrease of life expectancy induced by 
natural disasters is higher for women than for men. A gendered mortality effect against 
infant girls in the aftermath of typhoons in the Philippines is discovered by Anttila-Huges 
and Hsiang (2013). Similarly, for Burkina Faso and all sub-Saharan Africa it is shown 
that nutrition and health outcomes for girls are more negatively affected by droughts 
than for boys (Araujo Bonjean et al. 2012, Flatø and Kotsadam 2014). Related is the 
literature that differentiates outcomes of disasters along socio-economic status 
(Leichenko and Silva 2014, Bennett and Friel 2014).  
The recognition that social categories like status and gender co-determine the impacts of 
negative shocks, justifies and supports the vulnerability perspective which has been 
embraced by the climate change community early on.  
In the literature it is well established that vulnerability and adaptation depend on the 
level of development and institutional quality both on the macro and the micro level 
(e.g. Dow et al. 2006, Wheeler 2011, Lazzaroni and van Bergeijk 2014). Increasingly 
there is also recognition of the importance of the distribution of rights and resources and 
the detrimental impact of social inequalities. However, the empirical literature which 
quantifies the determinants of direct and indirect costs of disasters and extreme weather 
events mostly ignores those aspects of distribution. Exception are Anbarci et al. (2005) 
and Kuhn (2005) which show that the death toll from earthquakes and natural disasters 
are positively and significant correlated with the Gini coefficient of the income 
distribution.  
It is argued that social inequalities are negatively related to social cohesion and trust 
which are prerequisites for cooperation and the provision of public goods which are 
necessary for a society’s capacity to cope. Anbarci et al. (2005) provide a theoretical 
model where cooperation is necessary for the universal provision of adaptive measures 
with public goods character. If income inequality exceeds some threshold level, the rich 
will no longer participate in the provision of the public good and will only provide private 
adaptation for themselves. Germano and Demetrius (2014) argue, based on the recent 
theoretical concept of evolutionary entropy, that societies which are more equal are also 
more resilient. The underlying mechanism is again attributed to a higher level of 
cooperation among agents in such a society with flat hierarchies.  
We test two main hypothesis: (1) Ceteris paribus the impact of a given hazard is higher 
in countries with more unequal gender rights. (2)  Ceteris paribus the impact of a given 
hazard is higher in countries with a more concentrated distribution of income. The 
impact is measured by disaster fatalities. 
The next section provides a detailed discussion of the data employed in the analysis and 
its shortcomings. In Section 3 the empirical strategy is laid out and the appropriate 
methodological approach is discussed. In the fourth section a detailed description of the 
variables used, their statistical properties and their distribution over time and space is 
provided. Section 5 presents the results. In Section 6 a multiplicity of robustness checks 
are discussed. Section 7 concludes by summarizing the results, pointing out caveats and 
discussing avenues for future research.  
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2. The Data  
 
In order to tackle the influence of social inequalities on fatality rates associated with 
extreme weather events we take a macroeconomic perspective with a given country in a 
given year as unit of observation. The macro-perspective is chosen for a number of 
reasons: disaster fatalities and disaster occurrence is mostly not available on a 
subnational level, the distribution of gender rights and incomes are structural variables 
which are often not available on a subnational level. In the following we discuss the 
variables of interest, their underlying data sources and caveats to be considered with 
respective data. 
 
2.1 Measuring climate related disasters 
To capture extreme weather events we use the EM-DAT disaster data from Centre for 
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) which records disasters going back to 
1900. A disaster is recorded if one or more of the following conditions hold: ten or more 
people are reported killed, a hundred or more people are reported affected, a state of 
emergency was declared and/or international assistance was called for. 
We restrict our attention to four types of extreme weather events: droughts, floods, 
storms and extreme temperature events. These types of events are reasonable closely 
linked to the climate and are expected to become more frequent with increases in 
weather variability as likely induced by climate change (IPCC 2012). 
EM-DAT records the date and country when and where a disaster strikes, the resulting 
dead and missing persons, people homeless and affected and a damage estimate. The 
total number of fatalities (totdeath_4d)1 from the four disasters analysed will be our 
dependent variable. Descriptive statistics are relegated to section 4. A multiplicity of 
possible reporting biases underlying this data and the related literature will be discussed 
in subsection 2.4 on data problems below. 
 
2.2 Measuring social inequalities 
While social inequalities can embrace a multiplicity of dimension we restrict our attention 
to two dimensions of inequality (Blackburn 2008): the concentration of incomes and the 
distribution of gender rights which now will be discussed in turn. 
 
2.2.1 Income Inequality 
To measure the degree of income inequality we use the Gini coefficient of market 
(gini_market) and after tax and transfers income (gini_net). The measurement of the 
distribution of incomes presupposes the definition of an income concept and the choice 
of an appropriate concentration measure. Differences in the measurement of individual 
and household incomes before and after tax and transfers make a comparison of income 
measures and more so of the derived concentration measures problematic (Atkinson and 
Brandolini 2001). For some countries and some years there are highly standardized 
income measures available and full comparability of concentration measures is ensured.2 
This however restricts the sample size to a few countries and a short time span. 
Accordingly there is a trade-off between sample size and comparability. The 
Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) is constructed with this trade-
off in mind and aims to maximize the sample size while accounting for the problems of 
                                           
1 Variables are generally set in italics. 
2 See the LIS project at http://www.lisdatacenter.org/ 
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comparability, making efforts to minimizing them (Solt 2009, 2014). The SWIID provides 
the Gini coefficient of market and net incomes for a large sample of country years 
(sample details and descriptive statistics are provided in Section 4). In addition a second 
estimate of the Gini coefficient as provided by the World Bank will be used. The Gini 
coefficient of incomes is strongly influenced by middle incomes and gives less emphasis 
on very high and low incomes. The index does not specify where in the income 
distribution the inequality occurs. Accordingly, two very different income distributions 
could result in the same Gini coefficient. The Gini is still the most widely used measure of 
income concentration. 
 
2.2.1 Gender Inequality 
Gender inequality 3  is the second dimension of social inequality we consider. It is a 
concept that poses considerable challenges to operationalization and measurement. Not 
only is it difficult to define what gender equality is, but the concept of gender itself is 
complex and multifaceted. It is a contested concept4 and its meaning is highly context 
dependent5. Reducing the gender concept to the simple dichotomy of men and women, it 
is still necessary to define what constitutes gender equality. Since gender equality might 
be domain dependent it is reasonable to employ a number of different measures across 
domains. The degree in which gender equality in education, labour markets or political 
participation constitute overall gender equality is up to debate. Blackburn et al. (2000) 
for example show, how two measures of gender equality, occupational gender 
segregation and the UN development measure of gender equality paint contrary pictures. 
Societies with more occupation gender segregation tend to have higher gender equality 
scores as measures by the UN. These problems should be kept in mind in the following 
analysis. 
A first step to capture gender inequalities is to look for gender discrimination in the 
formal legal rules of a country. Albeit today women are equal to men in the legal code of 
most countries, considerable inequalities persist in its application. The CIRI human rights 
data set (Cingranelli et al. 2014) provides measures of female political rights, female 
economic rights and female social rights.6 The ordinal variables are coded ranging from 
0-3. A score of 0 indicates that women are discriminated by formal legal rules, score 1 
indicates that respective rights are guaranteed by law but severely inhibited in practice. 
In countries with a score of 2 guaranteed legal rights for women are moderately 
inhibited in practice and a score of 3 indicates that respective women rights are 
guaranteed by law and in practice. The set of political, economic and social rights 
covered by the variables and their coding as provided in the detailed codebook are 
presented in Table A1 in the appendix. 
                                           
3 Gender is a contested concept. Increasingly the binary definition of male/female is 
rejected and gender perceived as a continuum where all combinations of biological sex 
and socially constructed gender co-exist. Gender equality in the present report refers to 
equal rights of women as compared to men and as such implicitly assumes the 
traditional, binary concept of gender. We acknowledge that gender equality needs to 
account for non-traditional gender identities but ignore these aspect for simplicity (and 
data availability). 
4 For problems with the measurement of economic gender inequality see e.g. Ponthieux 
and Meurs (2015). 
5 “Gender, rather than being an intractable characteristic of individuals, is dynamic and 
the roles, responsibilities, power relationships, and resources associated with being a 
man or a woman can vary significantly depending on the situation, even for the same 
individual.” (USAID, 2015). 
6 The variable on female social rights has been discontinued as of 2005/2007.  
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Since there might be some problems with the coding of the CIRI variables, as will be 
discussed in more detail in subsection 2.4 on data problems below, we also consider a 
couple of macroeconomic measures of female participation in education and the labour 
market. Those variables are derived from the World Development Indicators (WDI, 
World Bank 2015) and the Quality of Governance (QoG) Dataset (Teorell et al. 2015). 
More specifically, the ratio of female to male enrolment rates in primary 
(ratio_enroll_primary), secondary (ratio_enroll_second) and tertiary education 
(ratio_enroll_tertiary), as well as the gender ratio in primary and secondary education 
together (ratio_prim_sec) are used as education based indicators of gender equality. The 
share of the female labour force in the total labour force (female_lfp) is used as indicator 
of gender equality in the labour market. The finale indicator of gender equality in 
political participation is the share of female members of parliament (female_mp).  
Dreher et al. (2015) analyse if the allocation of foreign aid is influenced by gender 
inequality in recipient countries. They distinguish four types of gender inequality (gender 
inequality in economic and social rights, in survival, in education and in empowerment) 
and use similar proxies as we do. We omit gender inequality in survival since survival 
(i.e. the mortality rate) might be influenced by disaster fatalities, our dependent 
variable, thus creating endogeneity. In fact, Neumayer and Plümper (2007) show that 
conditional on women’s socioeconomic status, natural disasters reduce the life 
expectancy of women more than that of men. This is interpreted as evidence “that it is 
socially constructed gender-specific vulnerability of females built into everyday 
socioeconomic patters” (Neumayer and Plümper 2007) which lead to higher female 
mortality.  
 
2.3 Control Variables 
To minimize the problems of unobserved heterogeneity a multiplicity of country 
characteristics and co-determinants of vulnerability are included in the regressions. The 
data sources are the World Development Indicators (WDI, World Bank 2015) and the 
Quality of Governance (QoG) Dataset (Teorell et al. 2015). Individual controls employed 
will be introduced in the next section when the estimation strategy is explained. A 
detailed description of respective variables is then provided in Subsection 4.4. 
 
2.4 Problems with the data 
Empirical exercises are often considered messy because available data is incomplete, 
available variables only capture part of what the analyst wants to look at and because 
there is little guidance as to what is the appropriate specification. In the present 
subsection we discuss some of the problems with the data we are using. Specifically we 
will look at biased disaster recording in the EM-DAT data and coding problems in the 
measures of gender inequality from the CIRI human rights data. 
 
2.4.1 EM-DAT disaster data base 
The EM-DAT is still the most comprehensive, freely available and most widely used 
database of disaster events available. 7  Accordingly, we use this dataset to assure 
comparability of our results with the literature and to better understand the 
conditionality of published results. 
The entries to the EM-DAT are gathered from various sources like government and non-
government institutions, insurances and media outlets (Cavallo and Noy 2011). 
Accordingly, there are measurement errors “due to compilation errors and harmonization 
                                           
7 Tschoegl (2006) provides an analytical review of available data sets. 
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from various data sources” (Loayza et al. 2012). In addition there are systematic biases 
in the recording of disasters for a multiplicity of reasons: 
“One general concern is that reporting (and misreporting) of disasters varies 
systematically across time, levels of income, and political regimes. Reporting of 
small disasters is probably more complete in later years and in more developed 
countries” (Strömberg 2007, 201). 
Biased reporting of disaster occurrences can result e.g. from conscious over- or 
underreporting of governments, from  differential media coverage, differential insurance 
coverage or limited administrative capabilities in developing countries, to name but a 
few (Strömberg 2007, Raschky 2008). The resulting problem of measurement error in 
the data is even bigger when it comes to the number of disaster fatalities, people 
affected and the value of economic damages.  
In a recent contribution Felbermayr and Gröschl (2014) introduce a novel dataset 
(GeoMet) compiled from primary sources, i.e. meteorological and geological data. A 
disaster at a given geographic point (grid-cell) is derived from meteorological or 
geological indicators at that point that exceed (or undercut) some benchmark value. For 
example, the Richter scale is used to identify earthquakes and data on precipitation 
anomalies for the identification of droughts and floods. The authors compare their data 
with EM-DAT and find no correlation for earthquakes but considerable correlation for 
storms and hurricanes. However, there is a less pronounced time trend for storms in the 
GeoMet data. It is also shown that per-capita GDP is an important predictor for reporting 
earthquakes, storms and floods in EM-DAT. This creates a problem of endogeneity in 
studies that aim to determine the growth effect of natural disasters: the level or change 
of GDP per capita should be explained by the occurrence or strength of disasters the 
reporting of which in turn depend on the level of GDP per capita. For these type of 
studies the GeoMet has some great advantages. However, there are also problems with 
this type of disaster data. First, the dataset does not report natural disaster but natural 
hazards. Neither a tornado over an empty sea nor an earthquake in an empty desert are 
considered disasters. For a hazard to become a disaster, vulnerable entities have to be 
exposed to the hazard. Second, the primary data used to construct GeoMet are 
measured by a grid of globally distributed weather and geo-sensors. Especially the 
density of weather stations is also correlated with GDP per capita. A low density of 
weather stations increases the necessity for interpolation and simulation of 
meteorological variables and increases the uncertainty associated with these. A similar, 
albeit less grave problem of endogeneity as for EM-DAT might result (Auffhammer et al. 
2013). 
 
2.4.2 CIRI human rights data base 
The CIRI human rights data project provides “standards-based quantitative information 
on government respect for human rights in 202 countries, annually from 1981-2011” 
(Cingranelli et al. 2014). It contains three variables related to gender equality: women 
political (wopol), social (wosoc) and economic rights (wecon). They are coded based on 
information derived from the U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices (USSD). Critics state that the report is or can be subject to foreign policy 
political interests (e.g. The Guardian 2015). Also, albeit the CIRI project is very careful 
to provide clear coding rules and guidance in the case of missing or ambivalent 
information, some idiosyncratic leeway in the coding-decision remain. Lastly, as will be 
seen in Section 4 where the data is described in some detail, these measures do not 
exhibit a lot of variation making it difficult to estimate their effect. 
The CIRI variables on women rights should be complemented with further measures of 
gender equality not only for reasons of data reliability, but also because of the 
multifaceted aspect of gender equality which cannot be captured by a focus on legal 
rules and their enactment alone. 
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3. Methodology 
 
This section first discusses the assumptions taken when using the EM-DAT data. The 
characteristics of the dependent variable provides some guidance for the choice of the 
appropriate estimation method which is discussed in the next subsection. Finally the 
empirical strategy will be detailed. 
 
3.1 Using EM-DAT disaster data 
The EM-DAT data records the year and the country in which a disasters struck. We 
assume that in those years and countries which do not have an entry in the data no 
disaster has happened. Since disasters are still rare events, this creates a lot of zero 
entries. In order to better isolate the impact of disasters we restrict the sample and 
exclude all countries that do not experience any disaster in the observation period 1980-
2014.8  
In the main analysis two variables from EM-DAT are employed: total fatalities per 
disaster-type and count of occurrences per disaster-type. As mentioned earlier we 
restrict our attention to droughts, floods, extreme temperature events and storms and 
accordingly sum up the number of total fatalities from all these disasters, resulting in our 
dependent variable: sum of total deaths from the four analysed disaster types 
(totdeath_4d). To understand which estimation method is appropriate for respective 
data the descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1 and Table 2.9     
 
Table 1. Disaster fatalities by occurrence of droughts and extreme temperature events. 
Occurrence Droughts  Occurrence Extreme temp. 
 
Mean Variance N 
  
Mean Variance N 
         
0 0 0 6722 
 
0 0 0 6806 
1 1226.88 2.58E+08 474 
 
1 282.51 3221307.00 341 
2 0 0 12 
 
2 242.28 230188.40 54 
3 0 0 2 
 
3 6361.33 3.43E+08 9 
         
Total 80.66 1.70E+07 7210 
 
Total 23.12 5.89E+05 7210 
 
It is obvious that for all disaster types there are a lot of zero observations, i.e. country-
years without disasters and associated fatalities. Data with a large share of zero 
observations is called zero inflated data. Further, it can be seen that the variance of 
disaster fatalities by far exceeds the mean for almost all counts of disaster occurrence. 
This phenomenon is called over-dispersion. To explain this type of data the literature 
proposes a zero-inflated negative binomial count model (Green 2007, Kuhn 2005). 
 
 
 
                                           
8 Qualitatively results remain unchanged by this sample restriction.  
9 A more detailed look at the data is provided in Section 4. 
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Table 2. Disaster fatalities by occurrence of floods and storms. 
Occurrence Floods 
 
Occurrence Storms 
 
Mean Variance N 
  
mean variance N 
0 0 0 5143 
 
0 0 0 5831 
1 34.99 19604.74 1251 
 
1 42.73 266233.50 865 
2 82.30 69469.37 437 
 
2 647.60 80500000 240 
3 331.73 5429435 168 
 
3 416.60 3755881 91 
4 223.08 288576 83 
 
4 353.31 430863.20 49 
5 617.76 1652264 38 
 
5 308.97 194299.20 34 
6 487.74 395352.90 38 
 
6 462.16 1421275 25 
7 371.88 112506.50 16 
 
7 354.08 163645.20 12 
8 484.87 252943.30 15 
 
8 1236.15 3897454 13 
9 449.67 47831.47 6 
 
9 444.70 341120.20 10 
10 667.50 669324.50 2 
 
10 438.14 374521.10 7 
11 309 144722 2 
 
11 511.14 141305.80 7 
12 588 211548 3 
 
12 537.25 689294.30 4 
13 512 
 
1 
 
13 190.50 5940.50 2 
14 326 193442 2 
 
14 672 188304 4 
15 122 
 
1 
 
15 215.83 5597.37 6 
16 2051 
 
1 
 
16 167.50 7080.50 2 
17 1661.50 437112.50 2 
 
17 84.50 12.50 2 
18 430 
 
1 
 
18 27 
 
1 
Total 30.89 156958.80 7210 
 
19 190 
 
1 
     
20 247 3872 2 
     
23 180 
 
1 
     
27 95 
 
1 
     
Total 42.87 2785617 7210 
 
3.2 The zero inflated negative binomial count model (ZINB) 
 
For zero inflated count data the zero inflated Poisson model (ZIP) and the zero inflated 
negative binomial count model (ZINB), as established, e.g. by Heilbron (1994), Lambert 
(1992) and Greene (1994) can be appropriate approaches.10 These are two step models 
with “an equation for ‘participation’ and a model for the event count” (Green 2007, p. 
137), linked by an observation mechanism.   
The ZINB model maximizes the log likelihood function ln⁡𝐿 as defined by: 
𝑚 = 1/𝛼⁡   
𝑝𝑗 = 1/[1 + 𝛼 exp(𝐱𝑗𝛽)] 
                                           
10 Green (2007) provides an extensive overview over the whole family of count models. 
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ln⁡𝐿 = ∑ln⁡[𝐹(z𝑗𝛾) + {1 − 𝐹(z𝑗𝛾)}𝑝𝑗
𝑚] +
𝑗∈𝑆
 
+∑[ln⁡{1 − 𝐹(z𝑗𝛾)} + ln⁡Γ(𝑚 + 𝑦𝑗) − ln⁡Γ(𝑦𝑗 + 1) − ln⁡Γ(𝑚) + 𝑚⁡ln⁡𝑝𝑗 + 𝑦𝑗ln⁡(1 − 𝑝𝑗)] ⁡
𝑗∉𝑆
 
F is the inverse of the logit link, Γ  is the gamma distribution and S is the set of 
observations with outcome zero, i.e. country-year observations with no disaster fatalities 
(StataCorp 2015). The probability that a country in a given year has zero count for 
disaster fatalities is estimated with a logit model with explanatory variables contained in 
z𝑗. In the current context the number of observed disasters by disaster type are used as 
explanatory variable (To check robustness alternative specifications are employed, see 
Section 6). The count of positive disaster fatalities in turn are explained by a set of 
country characteristics, the level of economic development and respective measures of 
social inequality. Explanatory variables and controls are contained in x𝑗 . In the next 
subsection the various specifications employed will be discussed in some detail. 
Kahn (2005) used a similar methodological approach based on the ZINB model on the 
role of income, geography and institutions in the context of natural disasters. The 
estimations in the present paper are undertaken using the ZINB module integrated in 
Stata 14.  
 
3.3 The empirical strategy  
After defining configurations of estimates and sets of configuration the control variables 
will be discussed in some detail. 
 
3.3.1 Definition of sets, configurations and specifications 
For each independent variable of interest we estimate three configurations with six 
specifications or models. We call these 18 estimation models an analytical set for a given 
variable. Our results are derived from the main set and enforced by multiple robustness 
sets. The construction of the main set is now laid out in detail.  
The ZINB estimation model is a two-step estimation procedure. The first step consists of 
a logit regression that characterizes the excess zeroes in the data. In the main set these 
are explained by the count of occurrences of the different disaster types. The second 
step includes different control variables to account for unobserved heterogeneity.  
Each specification of the second step of the ZINB model has a general part and a specific 
part. In the general part which is present in all models, we control for the number of 
disaster occurrences (occur_drought, occur_flood, occur_extremetemp, occur_storm) for 
the log of a country’s area (ln_area), the log of its population (ln_pop) and the log of 
per-capita GDP (ln_pc_gdp). In the specific part the share of urban population 
(urban_pop), a democracy dummy (democ), a measure of corruption perception (ti_cpi), 
the government spending for education as a percentage of GDP (gov_exp_edu_gdp) and 
a measure of ethnic fractionalization (al_ethnic) is added. 
Since it is not obvious what is the correct model, in the first configuration each 
specification contains only one of the specific controls. In the second configuration the 
controls are included cumulatively so that specification 6 contains the full set of control 
variables. Configuration 3 repeats the setup of configuration 2 but adds a variable 
measuring the rule of law (wbgi_rle). Configuration 3 is included since the rule of law 
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(like corruption perception) has a strong tendency to fundamentally change estimation 
results.11    
Data availability differs across control variables, both in terms of country and year 
coverage. Accordingly, the sample size can change considerable across specifications 
within a set. However, we take the fact that estimation results are unchanged across 
varying samples as a first indication of their robustness in the sense that results are not 
driven by a specific sample of countries and years.      
 
3.3.2 Discussion of control variables 
The number of disaster occurrences has a direct effect on fatalities. If the disaster 
probability is naively assumed to be constant for each disaster, more disaster result in 
higher fatalities numbers. The marginal effect of an additional disaster is ambiguous. It 
might be positive if previous disasters reduce the resilience of society or might be 
negative if society can better cope with disasters due to increased experience and better 
preparation (Schumacher and Strobl 2011). The area of a country will influence the 
number and maybe also types of climate hazards occurring and ceteris paribus also 
influences population density which is of course a central determinant of disaster 
fatalities. This is even more so for the population: a higher population exposes ceteris 
paribus more people to a given hazard and accordingly should lead to higher casualty 
numbers. The level of socio-economic development as measures by the log of per capita 
GDP (in PPP) is one of the central determinants of vulnerability and adaptive capacity 
and higher levels of development are generally expected to lower disaster fatalities (e.g. 
Fankhauser and McDermott 2014, Raschky 2008). 
The urban population is often argued to be more vulnerable because of congestion 
effects and strong dependency on functioning supply chains. On the other hand the rural 
population is seen to be more vulnerable due to a higher dependency on local resources, 
lower incomes and missing infrastructure (Cutter et al. 2003). Certainly, the population 
density is higher in cities, so when a city is exposed to a climate hazard, more fatalities 
are to be expected than if a comparable hazard happens on the countryside. For a 
country of a given area a higher share of urban population concentrates the population 
in some urban areas which might or might not be disaster prone. The effect of 
democracy is debated in the literature. In general it is thought that democracies entail 
better institutions and higher levels of social participation which both contribute to a 
society’s resilience (Adger et al. 2005, Agrawal 2010, Raschky 2008). The corruption 
perception index (CPI) provided by Transparency International proxies the extent of 
corruption in society. Corruption can be understood as a malfunctioning of institutions, 
negatively affecting resilience and the capacity to cope (e.g. Banuri and Eckel 2012). 
Government spending on education as a fraction of GDP accounts for the relative use of 
resources for education which in general is thought to reduce vulnerability and increase 
resilience (Muttarak and Lutz 2014). Ethnic fractionalization is a measure of the degree 
of ethnic homogeneity in society. In general it is thought that homogeneity facilitates 
cooperation and the provision of public goods which both foster resilience through 
increasing adaptive and coping capacities (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000). The rule of law 
measure used in configuration 3 is a further measure of institutional quality with higher 
values expected to increase resilience thus lowering fatality rates. 
 
 
 
                                           
11  The World Bank provides six distinct measures of institutional quality, the other 
measures however are mostly insignificant. 
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4. Descriptive Statistics – Looking at the Data  
 
In the present section we take a more detailed look at the data employing descriptive 
statistics, time trends and geographical visualizations to get a better understanding of 
the dependent (disaster fatalities) and explanatory variables (social inequalities, disaster 
occurrence, controls). We first describe the sample before taking a closer look at 
fatalities and disaster count data from EM-DAT. Then the explanatory variables of 
interest measuring social inequalities are explored in some detail. Thirdly, we consider 
further control variables.  
In this section the data is taken at face value. Caveats regarding completeness and 
reliability of data are only mentioned on the side since they have been discussed in some 
detail in Section 2.  
 
4.1 Sample  
The basic sample comprises data for 206 countries over a timeframe of thirty-five years 
from 1980 till 2014. All countries in the sample are listed in Table A2 in the Annex. 
Sample size might vary considerably contingent on which control variables are included. 
Especially for the small island developing countries (SIDS) there is a lot of missing 
information. 
 
4.2 Climate related extreme weather events 
First we consider disaster occurrence. As a second step disaster fatalities will be 
described in some detail.  
 
4.2.1 Disaster occurrence   
Table 3a depicts the descriptive statistics for the whole sample including all zero values. 
There are 7210 country/year observations. On average there is about one disaster in 
each year in each country. Floods are the most common disasters, followed by storms. 
Droughts and extreme temperature events are rather rare events. There are a lot of 
country/year observations without any disaster observed. However there are also 
observations with up to 33 disasters occurring.  
 
Table 3a. Number of disaster occurrence by disaster type, full sample. 
Variable # Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
all 7,210 1.08 2.44 0 33 
Droughts 7,210 0.07 0.27 0 3 
Floods 7,210 0.53 1.24 0 20 
Storms 7,210 0.41 1.42 0 27 
Extreme temp. 7,210 0.07 0.29 0 3 
  
In Table 3b only non-negative occurrences are shown. Accordingly, there are 3072 
country/year observations (43%) with at least one of the disaster types occurring. 
Overall, EM-DAT records 500 droughts, 2050 floods, 1379 storms and 404 extreme 
temperature events for the sample under consideration.   
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Table 3b. Number of disaster occurrence by disaster type, only observations with at 
least one disaster. 
Variable # Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
all 3,072 2.54 3.21 1 33 
Droughts 500 1.03 0.20 1 3 
Floods 2,050 1.88 1.71 1 20 
Storms 1,379 2.16 2.62 1 27 
Extreme temp. 404 1.18 0.44 1 3 
 
To understand the distribution of disaster occurrence across time we average the 
number of occurrences over country income groups as defined by the World Bank. The 
evolution by income-group for all disasters is shown in Figure 1. There is an increasing 
time trend. Also on average disaster occurrence seems to be more frequent in OECD 
countries than in all other income groups. The increase in disaster frequency over time 
could be contributed to effects of climate change. However, both the time trend and the 
distribution of frequencies across income groups could also be driven by a recording bias 
across time and level of development, as discussed in Section 2.  
 
Figure 1. Disaster occurrence, all disasters by country-income-group. 
 
 
In Figure 2 the time trends across income-groups for the four disaster types are depicted 
individually. It is interesting to note the heterogeneity across disaster types.  For 
drought occurrence (panel a) there is a positive time trend in upper middle and low 
income countries. In contrast, extreme temperature events (panel d) seem to become 
more frequent in OECD countries and do not exhibit any trend over time in low income 
countries.  
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Figure 2. Disaster occurrence by country-income-group time for drought (a), flood (b), 
storm (c), extreme temperature (d). 
a)                                                            b) 
  
c)                                                            d) 
  
 
A quite pronounced positive time trend for floods (panel b) is observed for all income 
groups but for non-OECD high income countries. For storms (panel c) a small positive 
time trend is apparent throughout, with storms slightly more frequent in OECD 
countries.  
 
Map 1. Disaster occurrence per square kilometre. 
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A statistical perspective on disaster occurrence might ignore that disaster intensities can 
differ considerably across disasters. In disaster event data like the EM-DAT there is no 
measure of disaster intensity but only disaster outcomes (fatalities, people affected, 
economic damage) available.  
 
4.2.2 Disaster fatalities 
Disaster fatalities constitute the main dependent variable. The measurement of disaster 
fatalities is of course even more problematic than the measurement of disaster 
occurrences with an even more pronounced development bias. Contrary to disaster 
occurrence there is however no other alternative way to measure disaster fatalities. The 
descriptive statistics for casualties in climate related disasters are provided in Table 4a 
for the full sample and in Table 4b for the country/years where at least one disaster 
occurred.  
 
Table 4a. Total disaster fatalities by disaster type, full sample. 
Variable # Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
All 7,210 178.96 4539.41 0 300000 
Droughts 7,210 80.66 4128.43 0 300000 
Floods 7,210 32.13 404.04 0 30005 
Storms 7,210 42.87 1669.02 0 138987 
Extreme temp. 7,210 23.30 767.40 0 55760 
 
Table 4b. Total disaster fatalities by disaster type, only observations with at least one 
disaster.  
Variable # Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
All 3,072 420.01 6947.71 0 300000 
Droughts 500 1163.08 15651.54 0 300000 
Floods 2,050 113.02 751.80 0 30005 
Storms 1,379 224.14 3812.12 0 138987 
Extreme temp. 404 415.77 3220.38 0 55760 
 
On average 420 people die when a disaster strikes with droughts being the most deadly 
and floods the least deadly events. Extreme temperature events result in an average of 
415 fatalities per disaster. Since they are quite rare events, overall there are on average 
about 23 causalities per country/year observation. Figure 3 depicts all positive (i.e. >0) 
disaster fatality counts by disaster type over time. This representation clearly shows that 
average fatality numbers are rather misleading. There are very few disasters with very 
high causality numbers. If these extreme values are excluded the considerable variance 
becomes obvious, this is shown in Figure 4. There are still many disasters with 
thousands of fatalities across disaster types.   
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Figure 3. Non-zero counts of disaster fatalities by disaster-type over time for drought 
(a), flood (b), storm (c), extreme temperature (d). 
a)                                                            b) 
  
c)                                                            d) 
  
 
For droughts the trend line indicates clearly decreasing fatality counts. For the other 
disaster types there is also a moderate decreasing trend in fatalities over time. It is 
possible that this developments result from the global efforts on disaster risk reduction 
(e.g. Hyogo Framework). The geographical distribution of disaster fatalities per capita, 
averaged over time, are displayed in Map 2. 
 
Figure 4. Non-zero counts of disaster fatalities by disaster-type over time without 
extreme observations for drought (a), flood (b), storm (c), extreme temperature (d) 
(like Figure 3 with censored data). 
a)                                                            b) 
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c)                                                            d) 
  
 
Map 2. Disaster fatalities per capita over time (average 1980-2014). 
 
 
 
4.3 Social inequalities 
 
This analysis considers two dimensions of social inequality: income inequality and gender 
inequality. Both are multifaceted, complex concepts and problems of measurement are 
discussed in some detail in Section 2. We first describe the measures used to capture 
income inequality and then depict gender inequality. 
 
4.3.1 Income inequality   
The distribution of incomes is measured using the Gini coefficient of the income 
distribution for market incomes (gini_market) and after tax and transfer incomes 
(gini_net). Data source is the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID). 
In addition the World Bank provides own estimates of the Gini coefficient (gini_wb). As 
apparent in Table 5, these measures of the income distribution are only available for a 
subset of country/year observations. At least some information on the income 
distribution is available for 160 countries, with length and completeness of the time 
series varying across countries. The coverage of the World Bank data is even more 
limited. However, we use the World Bank estimates of the Gini coefficient for robustness 
checks and accordingly report the descriptive statistics in Table 5. The lower panel of 
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Table 5 reports the descriptive statistics for those country/years for which SWIID and 
World Bank estimates are available. This comparison suggests that the Word Bank 
estimates refer to the income distribution after taxes and transfers.12  
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics for Gini of net, market and available incomes (gini_net, 
gini_market, gini_wb). 
Variable # Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
gini_net 3,380 37.66 10.27 15.05 71.33 
gini_market 3,376 43.77 8.64 20.11 77.97 
gini_wb 1,081 40.47 10.39 16.23 74.33 
Common observations for SWIID and World Bank 
gini_net 895 39.09 9.71 16.82 69.79 
gini_market 895 44.21 7.72 20.11 70.96 
gini_wb 895 40.52 10.58 16.23 74.33 
 
Table 6 shows the average Gini coefficient across time and country by country income 
group. Countries which are economically more developed have on average a larger 
difference between the concentration of market and post-tax post-transfer incomes. This 
indicates that redistributive welfare states are more developed in richer countries. The 
average concentration of both, market and net incomes is higher in less developed 
countries. This perspective however neglects changes over time. 
 
Table 6. Gini of net and market income by country-income-group. 
 
gini_net gini_market 
 
Income group Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Freq. 
High income: OECD 28.95 5.50 42.12 4.74 32 
High income: 
nonOECD 
35.38 6.24 43.43 6.52 14 
Upper middle 
income 
41.39 10.02 44.58 9.40 44 
Lower middle 
income 
41.74 8.21 44.06 7.59 42 
Low income 44.29 6.76 45.35 6.91 27 
Total 38.94 9.56 43.98 7.48 159 
 
The development of income inequality of net and market incomes for country income 
groups over time is depicted in Figure 5. Panel a shows the evolution of the Gini of net 
incomes, panel b the Gini of market incomes. Averaging across countries within income 
groups there is no change in income concentration in OECD countries. High income non-
OECD countries and upper and lower middle income countries seem to have experienced 
a slight increase in income inequality after taxes and transfers. In low income countries 
                                           
12  From the metadata it seems that the World Bank provides the Gini of available 
household incomes.  
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there seems to be rather a downward trend in income concentration. The picture is 
different for market incomes as shown in panel b. Income concentration has increased in 
high income countries, remained by and large unchanged in middle income countries and 
has considerably decreased in low income countries.  
 
Figure 5. Gini of net (a) and market (b) incomes over time by country-income-group. 
a)                                                            b) 
  
 
Map 3 depicts the average Gini-coefficient of net incomes over all available years for 
each country. 
 
Map 3. Average Gini of net incomes across countries.  
 
 
4.3.2 Gender inequality   
The problems of defining and measuring gender equality, as discussed in Section 2, are 
being met using a multiplicity of measures to approximate the phenomenon. Table 7 
depicts the description of all employed variables which can be sorted in four groups: the 
variables from the CIRI data on women’s political, economic and social rights, the 
portion of seats held by women in national parliament (female_mp), female labour force 
participation (female_lfp) and female education (ratio_enroll_primary, 
ratio_enroll_second, ratio_enroll_tertiary, ratio_prim_sec). Data availability differs 
across variables with women political rights (wopol) and ration of female to male pupils 
enrolled in primary education (ratio_enroll_primary) having the broadest coverage. 
Further insights provided by Table 7 are that there are countries with no women in 
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parliament, there are countries where female labour force participation is higher than 
male but no countries where women do not work at all. For education there are countries 
where women do not receive any schooling (ratio=0) but also countries where more 
women receive primary, secondary or tertiary education then men. 
 
Table 7. Description of measures for gender equality. 
Variable 
Variable 
Name 
# Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
Women political rights* wopol 4,637 1.83 0.60 0 3 
Women economic rights* wecon 4,587 1.32 0.70 0 3 
Women social rights* wosoc 3,460 1.26 0.85 0 3 
Proportion of seats held 
by women in national 
parliaments Income (%) 
female_mp 3,134 15.37 10.63 0 63.80 
Labor force, female  
(% of total labor force) 
female_lfp 3,792 40.14 9.28 10.39 56.00 
Ratio of female to male 
primary enrollment (%) 
ratio_enroll_
primary 
4,612 93.02 12.70 0 143.33 
Ratio of female to male 
secondary enrollment (%) 
ratio_enroll_
second 
3,742 92.95 22.22 0 208.14 
Ratio of female to male 
tertiary enrollment (%) 
ratio_enroll_
tertiary 
3,124 97.54 48.22 0 642.02 
Ratio of girls to boys in 
primary and secondary 
education (%) 
ratio_prim_ 
sec 
3,624 93.97 14.17 0 143.93 
*see Table A1 in the Appendix for detailed description 
 
In Table 8 - Table 10 the variables on gender inequality are described by country income 
groups, aggregated over countries and years. For women economic (wecon) and social 
rights (wosoc), presented in Table 8, there is a monotonic increase in gender equality 
with income. In richer countries there are on average more gender rights. For women 
political rights (wopol) the high income non-OECD countries exhibit the lowest level, the 
OECD countries the highest level. The share of seats in parliament held by women 
(female_mp) is closely related to political rights (Table 9). Here we observe a u-shaped 
relation. The share of seats held by women is on average highest in high income OECD 
countries, low for non-OECD and middle income countries and comparatively high in low 
income countries. A similar u-shaped pattern is observed for female labour force 
participation (female_lfp) with the difference that labour force participation of women is 
on average highest in low income countries followed by high income OECD-countries. 
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Table 8. CIRI-variables described by country income groups. 
 
wopol wecon wosoc 
Country Inc. Group Mean SD Freq. Mean SD Freq. Mean SD Freq. 
High income OECD 2.18 0.49 945 2.00 0.58 938 2.22 0.74 719 
High income non-
OECD 
1.61 0.85 407 1.41 0.75 406 1.22 0.95 279 
Upper middle 
income 
1.79 0.57 1,248 1.30 0.62 1,231 1.15 0.68 913 
Lower middle 
income 
1.73 0.50 1,206 1.05 0.55 1,194 0.91 0.61 899 
Low income  1.72 0.61 831 0.93 0.51 818 0.84 0.54 650 
Total 1.83 0.60 4,637 1.32 0.70 4,587 1.26 0.85 3,460 
 
Table 9. Female members of parliament and labour force participation by country 
income groups (in %). 
 
female_mp female_flp ratio_flp 
Country Inc. Group Mean SD Freq. Mean SD Freq. Mean SD Freq. 
High income OECD 22.83 10.72 595 43.83 3.47 726 74.26 9.50 768 
High income non-
OECD 
14.29 9.53 295 38.23 11.75 311 66.02 16.29 504 
Upper middle 
income 
14.29 10.03 896 37.06 9.77 1,036 60.86 20.26 1,128 
Lower middle 
income 
11.78 8.68 848 37.92 9.04 1,032 62.42 20.76 1,104 
Low income  15.15 10.97 500 45.11 8.48 687 81.71 20.80 720 
Total 15.37 10.63 3,134 40.14 9.28 3,792 67.87 20.13 4,224 
 
For education we observe in Table 10 a positive relationship between higher income and 
a higher ratio of female to male education participation. Note that secondary and tertiary 
enrolment ratios are highest in high income non-OECD countries. Gender equality in 
terms of education participation is granted if the enrolment ratio equals 100%. The fact 
that female participation in secondary and tertiary education in the three top income 
groups are higher than male participation also indicates a form of gender inequality.  
 
Table 10. Female to male enrolment ratio by country income groups (in %) 
 
Primary enrollment Secondary enrollment Tertiary enrollment 
Country Inc. Group Mean SD Freq. Mean SD Freq. Mean SD Freq. 
High income OECD 99.45 1.54 954 101.62 5.66 925 111.31 28.18 919 
High income non-
OECD 
98.55 5.60 477 103.07 12.19 402 128.72 50.38 353 
Upper middle 
income 
97.00 5.30 1,186 101.46 15.56 1,028 116.17 48.89 750 
Lower middle 
income 
92.10 11.78 1,250 89.08 24.06 876 80.90 39.99 673 
Low income  76.43 17.98 745 58.80 20.21 511 35.94 20.55 429 
Total 93.02 12.70 4,612 92.95 22.22 3,742 97.54 48.22 3,124 
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To better understand how gender rights evolved over time Figure 6 and 7 depict a 
subset of the variables in Table 7. Women political rights and the closely related share of 
women in parliament have increased over time in all country groups (Fig. 6 a, b). For 
women’s economic rights the time trend is less obvious. In Figure 6c there seems to be 
a slight increase in high income countries, no change over time in middle income 
countries and a decline in economic freedoms in low income countries. Women social 
rights are depicted in Figure 6d, averages show a similar evolution over time as 
economic rights.    
 
Figure 6. Women rights (a, c, d) and share of female members of parliament (b) over 
time by country-income-group 
a)                                                             b) 
  
c)                                                             d) 
  
 
Figure 7 indicates gender equality in terms of labour force and education participation. 
The ratio of female to male labour force participation is increasing over time in all 
country income groups and is on the highest level in low income countries. The share of 
women in the labour force is not depicted since the figure is qualitatively alike. The 
evolution of female education participation is similar for primary and secondary 
education (Fig. 7b, c). For non-tertiary education there is basically gender equality for 
high income countries and upper middle income countries. The latter experienced some 
increase in female education enrolment since 1980. For lower middle income countries 
and low income countries there is a marked increase in female education participation on 
primary and secondary level. For tertiary education, depicted in Figure 7d, female to 
male enrolment ratios increase in all country income groups. However, in high and upper 
middle income countries there are more women enrolled then men, i.e. the ratio is 
higher than 100%. It will also be explored if this form of gender equality affects 
aggregate vulnerability in the context of extreme weather events. 
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Figure 7. Female labour force participation (a) female to male enrolment ratio in 
primary (b), secondary (c) and tertiary (d) education over time by income group.  
a)                                                             b) 
  
c)                                                             d) 
  
 
Maps, depicting the geographical distribution of all these measures of gender (in)equality 
are relegated to the Appendix (Map A1-A9). 
 
4.4 Correlation among different measures of gender and income 
inequality 
The correlation coefficients among our distributional variables of interest are shown in 
Table 11.13 It is interesting to note that all measures of gender equality are significantly 
negatively related with the Gini of net incomes. If after tax and transfer incomes are 
more concentrated, there is on average less gender equality. This is not true for the 
correlation with the Gini of market incomes. This indicates that countries with 
functioning welfare state institutions also exhibit higher levels of gender equality. 
 
 
 
 
                                           
13  The correlation coefficients among the variables for education participation are 
omitted for brevity. They are all significantly positive and high (>.5). 
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Table 11. Correlation among measures of gender and income inequality. 
 
 
Gini net 
Gini 
market 
wopol wosoc wecon 
Female
mp 
Female 
lfp 
Gini market 0.7507* 1.0000 
     
wopol -0.2796* -0.0250 1.0000 
    
wosoc -0.4647* -0.0975* 0.4475* 1.0000 
   
wecon -0.3986* -0.0599* 0.3648* 0.7412* 1.0000 
  
Female mp -0.3195* 0.0657* 0.6661* 0.4714* 0.3259* 1.0000 
 
Female lfp -0.1270* 0.0512* 0.3796* 0.2969* 0.2047* 0.2994* 1.0000 
ratio primary -0.1660* 0.0704* 0.2735* 0.3241* 0.3024* 0.2190* 0.1299* 
ratio second. -0.0955* 0.1181* 0.2420* 0.3453* 0.3217* 0.1517* 0.0570* 
ratio tertiary -0.2075* 0.0500* 0.2457* 0.3508* 0.3277* 0.1862* 0.0713* 
ratio prim+sec -0.1436* 0.1083* 0.2716* 0.3696* 0.3344* 0.2069* 0.1261* 
Note: * p<.05 
 
4.5 Further controls 
To reduce unobserved heterogeneity across countries we include multiple control 
variables which are in general considered important in the vulnerability literature and as 
such might systematically influence the number of fatalities.   
 
Table 12. Descriptive statistics of control variables. 
Variable 
Variable 
name 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
population population 6,515 2.98e+07 1.16e+08 7525 1.36e+09 
Ln(population) ln_pop 6,515 15.26 2.21 8.93 21.03 
area area 6,605 704339.2 1939177 20 1.71e+07 
Ln(area) ln_area 6,605 11.30 2.71 3.00 16.65 
per capita GDP, PPP gdp_pc_ppp 4,187 13184.08 15144.13 142.02 138024.9 
Ln(per capita GDP, 
PPP) 
ln_pc_gdp 4,187 8.84 1.21 4.96 11.84 
Rule of law wbgi_rle 2,504 -0.12 0.98 -2.67 2.00 
Urban population pop_urban 6,518 52.00 24.07 4.34 100.00 
Democracy democ 7,210 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 
TI-corruption 
perception index 
ti_cpi 2,339 4.23 2.19 0.40 10.00 
Government edu. 
exp. (% of GDP) 
gov_exp_edu
_gdp 
2,665 4.57 2.08 0.00 44.33 
Ethnic 
fractionalization 
al_ethnic 5,402 0.43 0.26 0.00 0.93 
Value added of agri. 
sector (% GDP) 
valueadded_ 
agri 
4,951 17.70 14.72 0.00 93.98 
Poverty gap (at 2$ 
per day in %) 
poverty_2 936 12.33 15.24 0.00 77.20 
Poverty headcount 
ratio (at 2$ per day 
in % of population) 
poverty_ratio
2 
936 27.92 28.24 0.00 98.98 
Latitude lp_lat_abst 5,646 0.28 0.19 0.00 0.72 
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5. Results 
 
In the following the results from the main set of regressions for gender equality, income 
inequality and the two types of (in)equality together are presented and interpreted.  
 
5.1 Gender equality 
The relation of gender equality on disaster fatalities is firstly analysed with proxies from 
female education participation. Secondly, female labour force participation will be 
analysed. Finally, we will look at measures of female rights and political participation. 
To make the analysis comprehensible the first result is presented in full detail, i.e. all six 
specifications of configuration 1 are depicted. The multiplicity of different variables used 
to approximate social inequalities, the high number of specifications and especially the 
extensive robustness tests make it necessary to present our results in an ever more 
aggregated way.  
 
5.1.1 Female education participation 
Table 13 depicts all regression coefficients obtained in all six specifications of 
configuration 1, i.e. auxiliary controls are included individually, for the ratio of female to 
male enrolment in secondary education. As could be seen in the descriptive statistics, 
there are a number of countries where more women participate in secondary education 
then men. This of course also constitutes a form of gender inequality. Since any form of 
unequal education participation constitutes a form of gender inequality, a non-linear 
relation between female education participation and vulnerability can be expected. To 
account for this non-linear relation the ratio of female/male enrolment in secondary 
education, the squared variable is also included in the estimation. The estimated 
coefficients are negative and significant at a .1% level. In contrast the coefficients for 
the squared values are significantly positive. 
This means that there is an inverted u-shaped relation between female secondary 
education participation and the number of disaster fatalities. Increasing the ratio of 
women enrolled decreases the likelihood of more disaster fatalities up to the point of 
equal enrolment. Further increases in the relative enrolment of women increase the 
likelihood of higher numbers of disaster casualties. 
What do the other coefficients tell us? A higher number of floods and extreme 
temperature events increase the likelihood of observing higher death counts, the 
coefficients for storms and droughts are not significantly different from zero. A bigger 
population significantly increases the likelihood of more disaster fatalities, while a bigger 
land area reduces it. Also, in general a higher level of socio-economic development as 
measured in the log of per capita GDP has, as hypothesized, a significantly negative 
effect on disaster fatalities. 
Regarding the auxiliary controls, all variables but democracy have the expected sign, 
corruption and education expenditure are significant. The corruption perception index 
gives higher values to countries with a lower corruption perception. Lower levels of 
corruption perception significantly reduce the likelihood of high numbers of disaster 
fatalities. This is in line with the general presumption, that better functioning institutions 
reduce vulnerability.  
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Table 13. Female/male enrolment ratio secondary education and square. 
totdeath_4d (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Occurrence:       
drought -0.164 -0.153 -0.167 -0.100 -0.042 -0.170 
 (-1.06) (-0.99) (-1.08) (-0.56) (-0.22) (-1.09) 
flood 0.127** 0.130** 0.128** 0.011 0.138** 0.121** 
 (3.11) (3.18) (3.13) (0.28) (2.65) (2.90) 
extreme temp. 1.613*** 1.624*** 1.600*** 1.801*** 2.418*** 1.637*** 
 (10.54) (10.56) (10.22) (10.09) (13.12) (10.49) 
storm -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 0.034 0.023 0.003 
 (-0.15) (-0.11) (-0.20) (1.04) (0.75) (0.11) 
Ln(pop) 0.728*** 0.733*** 0.725*** 0.903*** 0.632*** 0.758*** 
 (14.07) (14.16) (13.77) (13.89) (9.44) (13.94) 
Ln(area) -0.179*** -0.190*** -0.173*** -0.266*** -0.170** -0.216*** 
 (-3.69) (-3.84) (-3.41) (-5.19) (-2.82) (-4.15) 
Ln(pc_gdp) -0.281*** -0.350*** -0.285*** -0.050 -0.430*** -0.252*** 
 (-4.21) (-3.91) (-4.21) (-0.56) (-4.91) (-3.51) 
Enrolment ratio -0.187*** -0.180*** -0.185*** -0.263*** -0.080* -0.191*** 
secondary education (-6.62) (-6.32) (-6.44) (-6.83) (-2.00) (-6.43) 
Squared enrolment  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001* 0.001*** 
ratio second. edu. (7.88) (7.37) (7.53) (8.10) (2.41) (7.67) 
Urban pop  0.005     
  (1.16)     
Democracy   0.055    
   (0.38)    
Corruption 
perception 
   -0.168***   
    (-3.52)   
Government educ. 
expenditure 
    -0.115*  
     (-2.43)  
Ethnic 
fractionalization 
     0.347 
      (1.25) 
_cons 3.250* 3.428** 3.203* 3.067 2.096 2.978* 
 (2.44) (2.59) (2.40) (1.63) (1.17) (2.04) 
inflate       
Occurrence       
drought -20.712 -23.534 -21.962 -22.115 -22.842 -20.769 
 (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) 
flood -25.655 -28.474 -26.902 -26.240 -26.973 -25.687 
 (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) 
extreme temp. -27.159 -29.939 -28.416 -27.835 -27.338 -26.973 
 (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) 
storm -26.148 -28.998 -27.391 -27.472 -27.578 -26.218 
 (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00) 
_cons 23.871 26.694 25.121 24.371 25.523 23.931 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
lnalpha       
_cons 1.160*** 1.160*** 1.160*** 1.133*** 1.102*** 1.154*** 
 (29.34) (29.32) (29.33) (25.34) (22.24) (28.74) 
N 2660 2660 2660 1641 1617 2500 
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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The lower panel provides the coefficients of the first step logit regression to account for 
the zero observations. The coefficients for the number of occurrences of the different 
disasters are all negative. A higher number of occurrences reduces the likelihood of 
observing zero fatalities. In this configuration the coefficients are all insignificant. 
Especially for configuration 3 we often obtain significant coefficients. For each regression 
we perform the Vuong test which indicates throughout that the zero inflated model is to 
be preferred. In addition a likelihood ration test is performed to assure that the zero 
inflated negative binomial model is preferred to the zero-inflated poisson model. 
For the other results of the main set only regression coefficients for the variables of 
interest will be reported. 14  Table 14 depicts the coefficients for the female/male 
enrolment ratios in secondary education for all three configurations (C1-C3). 
 
Table 14. Coefficients for female/male enrolment ratio secondary education 
(ratio_enroll_second). 
 
est1 est2 est3 est4 est5 est6 
  
Share of 
urban pop 
Democracy 
Corruption 
perception 
Gov. educ. 
expenditure 
Ethnic frac. 
C1: Individual 
      
Sec. educ. ratio -0.187*** -0.180*** -0.185*** -0.263*** -0.080* -0.191*** 
 
(-6.62) (-6.32) (-6.44) (-6.83) (-2.00) (-6.43) 
ratio squared 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001* 0.001*** 
 
(7.88) (7.37) (7.53) (8.10) (2.41) (7.67) 
C2: Cumulative 
      
Sec. educ. ratio -0.187*** -0.180*** -0.179*** -0.261*** 
 
-0.158* 
 
(-6.62) (-6.32) (-6.17) (-6.34) 
 
(-2.32) 
ratio squared 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
 
0.001** 
 
(7.88) (7.37) (7.10) (7.28) 
 
(2.91) 
C3: +rule of law 
      
Sec. educ. ratio -0.088** -0.096** -0.087** -0.108** -0.169* -0.148* 
 
(-2.85) (-3.07) (-2.64) (-2.76) (-2.42) (-2.01) 
ratio squared 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001** 
 
(3.31) (3.61) (3.04) (3.31) (3.04) (2.64) 
Note: Coefficients from ZINB estimation, t-statistics in parenthesis. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001. For missing entries the estimation process did not converge. 
 
Accordingly, line 3-6 of Table 14 contain the same information about the effect of 
secondary enrolment ratios as Table 13. The coefficients are qualitatively similar in all 
three configurations C1-C3, so that there is some evidence for a statistical significant 
relation between female participation in secondary education and a society’s vulnerability 
to climate related extreme weather events. 
The results for primary education enrolment are depicted in Table 15. The estimation 
process does not converge for three specifications. Most other specifications indicate a 
negative relation between gender equality in primary education and vulnerability. 
However, when relative government expenditure is included in the estimation, 
insignificant positive coefficients result. Accordingly, there is only weak evidence for the 
importance of gender equality in primary education in reducing vulnerability. 
                                           
14 All complete estimation tables are available from the authors upon request. 
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Table 15. Coefficients for female/male enrolment ratio primary education 
(ratio_enroll_primary). 
 
est1 est2 est3 est4 est5 est6 
  
Share of 
urban pop 
Democracy 
Corruption 
perception 
Gov. educ. 
expenditure 
Ethnic frac. 
C1: Individual 
      
Prim. educ. ratio  -0.154*  -0.520*** 0.024 -0.179* 
 
 (-2.16)  (-3.48) (0.23) (-2.32) 
ratio squared  0.001**  0.003*** -0.000 0.001** 
 
 (2.65)  (3.80) (-0.05) (2.77) 
C2: Cumulative       
Prim. educ. ratio  -0.154* -0.153* -0.483*** 0.050 0.072 
 
 (-2.16) (-2.14) (-3.38) (0.21) (0.32) 
ratio squared  0.001** 0.001** 0.003*** 0.000 -0.000 
 
 (2.65) (2.63) (3.68) (0.04) (-0.04) 
C3: +rule of law       
Prim. educ. ratio -0.369*** -0.392*** -0.395*** -0.679*** 0.080 0.093 
 
(-3.71) (-3.92) (-3.99) (-4.60) (0.34) (0.41) 
ratio squared 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** -0.000 -0.000 
 
(4.16) (4.41) (4.48) (5.07) (-0.03) (-0.07) 
Note: Coefficients from ZINB estimation, t-statistics in parenthesis. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001. For missing entries the estimation process did not converge. 
 
For the tertiary education enrolment ratio, shown in Table 16, estimation coefficients are 
all positive and often weakly significant. The positive coefficient can also be found for the 
linear specification without the quadratic term. Inspecting the data to understand this 
statistical result, one finds very high mean female/male enrolment ratios in small island 
developing countries (e.g. Bermuda 195%, Domenica 225%, Jamaica 215%, Puerto Rico 
150%, Panama 152%). The authors reject the interpretation that a reduction in female 
tertiary education could reduce vulnerability. Rather an increase in male tertiary 
education seems warranted.  
As a final variable for gender equality in education we look at the female/male enrolment 
ration in primary and secondary education as depicted in Table 17. Estimated 
coefficients are all negative, often significantly so at p <.1. This again indicates that 
more gender equality in primary or secondary education is negatively related to disaster 
fatalities or in other words, positively related to vulnerability.  
Overall, there is some evidence that gender equality in education reduces vulnerability to 
extreme weather events. This is especially true for secondary education where we find 
consistent and statistical significant effects and to some degree for primary education. 
Tertiary education is a special case since it seems that especially in a number of 
developing countries, female participation in tertiary education far exceeds male 
participation. In order to understand what this means for gender equality in general and 
for tertiary education in particular, further study of this phenomenon is needed. 
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Table 16. Coefficients for female/male enrolment ratio tertiary education (ratio_enroll_ 
tertiary). 
 
est1 est2 est3 est4 est5 est6 
  
Share of 
urban pop 
Democracy 
Corruption 
perception 
Gov. educ. 
expenditure 
Ethnic frac. 
C1: Individual 
      
Tert. educ. ratio 0.010* 0.012* 0.010* 0.013+ 0.009 0.010* 
 
(2.00) (2.43) (1.99) (1.78) (1.33) (2.07) 
ratio squared -0.000+ -0.000* -0.000+ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000+ 
 
(-1.72) (-2.20) (-1.72) (-1.62) (-0.84) (-1.80) 
C2: Cumulative       
Tert. educ. ratio 0.010* 0.012* 0.012* 0.017* 0.011 0.012 
 
(2.00) (2.43) (2.42) (2.20) (1.14) (1.22) 
ratio squared -0.000+ -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 
 
(-1.72) (-2.20) (-2.22) (-2.22) (-0.94) (-0.99) 
C3: +rule of law       
Tert. educ. ratio 0.004 0.008 0.007 0.015+ 0.008  
 
(0.68) (1.21) (1.07) (1.77) (0.73)  
ratio squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000+ -0.000  
 
(-0.47) (-1.04) (-1.03) (-1.86) (-0.73)  
Note: Coefficients from ZINB estimation, t-statistics in parenthesis. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001. For missing entries the estimation process did not converge. 
 
Table 17. Coefficients for female/male enrolment ratio primary + secondary education 
(ratio_prim_sec). 
 
est1 est2 est3 est4 est5 est6 
  
Share of 
urban pop 
Democracy 
Corruption 
perception 
Gov. educ. 
expenditure 
Ethnic frac. 
C1: Individual       
prim-sec ratio -0.311*** -0.215**  -0.680*** -0.090 -0.320*** 
 
(-4.18) (-3.07)  (-5.27) (-0.88) (-4.07) 
ratio squared 0.002*** 0.001***  0.004*** 0.001 0.002*** 
 
(4.66) (3.31)  (5.74) (1.07) (4.57) 
C2: Cumulative       
prim-sec ratio -0.311*** -0.215** -0.168* -0.471*** -0.471* -0.392+ 
 
(-4.18) (-3.07) (-2.34) (-3.78) (-2.16) (-1.73) 
ratio squared 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001* 0.003*** 0.003* 0.002* 
 
(4.66) (3.31) (2.46) (4.00) (2.42) (2.01) 
C3: +rule of law       
prim-sec ratio -0.187* -0.212* -0.167+ -0.291** -0.414+ -0.324 
 
(-2.33) (-2.57) (-1.91) (-2.60) (-1.79) (-1.35) 
ratio squared 0.001* 0.001** 0.001* 0.002** 0.003* 0.002+ 
 
(2.51) (2.79) (2.03) (2.83) (2.09) (1.66) 
Note: Coefficients from ZINB estimation, t-statistics in parenthesis. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001. For missing entries the estimation process did not converge. 
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5.1.2 Female labour force participation 
The estimation results for female labour force participation are shown in Table 18. All 
coefficients are negative and highly significant, indicating a strong statistical relation 
between more equal gender participation in the labour market and lower disaster 
fatalities. 
 
Table 18. Coefficients for female labour force participation (% of total workforce, 
female_lfp). 
 
est1 est2 est3 est4 est5 est6 
  
Share of 
urban pop 
Democracy 
Corruption 
perception 
Gov. educ. 
expenditure 
Ethnic frac. 
C1: Individual       
Female lfp -0.054*** -0.044*** -0.054*** -0.033*** -0.048*** -0.047*** 
 
(-7.24) (-6.39) (-7.34) (-3.39) (-5.94) (-6.36) 
C2: Cumulative       
Female lfp -0.054*** -0.044*** -0.043*** -0.030** -0.057*** -0.057*** 
 
(-7.24) (-6.39) (-6.20) (-3.25) (-5.06) (-5.03) 
C3: +rule of law       
Female lfp -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.046*** -0.062*** -0.061*** 
 
(-5.34) (-5.32) (-5.31) (-4.89) (-4.98) (-4.92) 
Note: Coefficients from ZINB estimation, t-statistics in parenthesis. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001. For missing entries the estimation process did not converge. 
 
If we allow for a non-linear relationship and include a squared term for female labour 
force participation, results indicate a counterintuitive positive, marginally decreasing 
relationship. This is probably related to the fact that in most countries women constitute 
by far less than 50% of the work force. In fact, the only countries where the mean share 
of women in the labour force is bigger than 50% is Burundi (51.7%), Cambodia 
(50.5%), Mozambique (54.8%), Rwanda (52%) and  Sierra Leone (50.6%). The non-
linear specification is accordingly rejected. 
 
5.1.3 Gender rights and political participation 
The share of female members of parliament is used as proxy for political participation of 
women. Women’s political, economic and social rights are measured with by the CIRI 
variables discussed in some detail in Section 2. 
The estimated coefficients for the share of female members of parliament are presented 
in Table 19. The majority of coefficients is significantly negative, indicating that a higher 
share of female members of parliament is associated with a lower death toll when 
disasters strike. However, six coefficients are insignificant and two of these even have a 
positive sign. This questions the robustness of these findings which will be put to 
scrutiny in the next section on robustness checks.   
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Table 19. Coefficients for share of female members of parliament (female_mp). 
 
est1 est2 est3 est4 est5 est6 
  
Share of 
urban pop 
Democracy 
Corruption 
perception 
Gov. educ. 
expenditure 
Ethnic frac. 
C1: Individual       
Female MP -0.036*** -0.029*** -0.036*** -0.010 -0.012+ -0.025*** 
 
(-5.94) (-5.02) (-5.98) (-1.43) (-1.69) (-3.76) 
C2: Cumulative       
Female MP -0.036*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.009 0.002 0.000 
 
(-5.94) (-5.02) (-4.87) (-1.29) (0.23) (0.04) 
C3: +rule of law       
Female MP -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.022** -0.005 -0.003 
 
(-3.53) (-3.52) (-3.53) (-2.89) (-0.58) (-0.31) 
Note: Coefficients from ZINB estimation, t-statistics in parenthesis. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001. For missing entries the estimation process did not converge. 
 
The results for the variable measuring women politic rights is presented in Table 20. The 
variable is ordinal coded with values from zero to three and increasing values indication 
more political rights for women. The ordinal nature of the variable necessitates an 
indicator variable approach. The reference category is zero. For example, in estimation 1 
(est1) of configuration 1 (C1), the first estimate indicates that in a country with wopol=1 
the likelihood of more disaster fatalities as compared to wopol=0 significantly increases 
with p<.05. This is even more true if wopol=2. Also the coefficient for wopol=3 is 
positive, albeit insignificant. For wopol=1 and wopol=3 most coefficients are insignificant 
and often change their sign. The coefficients for wopol=2 though is consistently positive 
and mostly significant. This would imply that an increase in women’s political rights, as 
measures by this CIRI variable, is associated with more disaster fatalities and thus more 
vulnerability. These results questions the fundamental hypothesis of this report that 
more equal societies are less vulnerable.    
 
Table 20. Coefficients for women political rights (wopol). 
 
est1 est2 est3 est4 est5 est6 
  
Share of 
urban pop 
Democracy 
Corruption 
perception 
Gov. educ. 
expenditure 
Ethnic frac. 
C1: Individual       
1.wopol 0.397* 0.227 0.358+ 0.365 -0.435+ 0.322+ 
 
(2.16) (1.27) (1.87) (1.27) (-1.85) (1.73) 
2.wopol 1.160*** 0.999*** 1.135*** 1.468*** 0.316 0.802*** 
 
(5.39) (4.61) (5.22) (4.46) (1.18) (3.47) 
3.wopol 0.094 0.336 0.043 1.323** 0.007 -0.226 
 (0.31) (1.11) (0.14) (3.26) (0.02) (-0.71) 
C2: Cumulative       
1.wopol 0.397* 0.227 0.281 0.376 -0.093 -0.101 
 
(2.16) (1.27) (1.53) (1.36) (-0.28) (-0.30) 
2.wopol 1.160*** 0.999*** 1.026*** 1.569*** 0.828* 0.795* 
 
(5.39) (4.61) (4.70) (4.81) (2.04) (1.96) 
3.wopol 0.094 0.336 0.436 1.527*** 0.589 0.542 
 (0.31) (1.11) (1.41) (3.86) (1.29) (1.18) 
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C3: +rule of law       
1.wopol -0.200 -0.205 -0.091 0.207 0.044 0.038 
 (-0.93) (-0.95) (-0.39) (0.69) (0.11) (0.09) 
2.wopol 1.625*** 1.646*** 1.749*** 2.082*** 0.992+ 0.943+ 
 (6.34) (6.44) (6.56) (6.20) (1.90) (1.81) 
3.wopol 1.268*** 1.237*** 1.391*** 1.733*** 0.678 0.583 
 (3.54) (3.46) (3.74) (3.98) (1.16) (0.99) 
Note: Coefficients from ZINB estimation, t-statistics in parenthesis. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001. For missing entries the estimation process did not converge. 
 
However, as pointed out in the description of the data, there is very little variation in the 
CIRI variables and the coding process is vulnerable to bias. Also the robustness of these 
findings have to be considered (in Section 6). 
Table 21 presents the coefficients for configuration 1 (C1) for women’s social rights and 
women’s economic rights. The coefficients for both variables exhibit a similar pattern as 
those for women’s political rights with inconsistent results for right levels 1 and 3 but 
rather consistently positive effect for rights level 2. Since this pattern repeats itself for 
configuration 2 and 3 for both variables, for the sake of brevity these coefficients are not 
reported. 
 
Table 21. Coefficients for configuration 1 (C1) women social right (wosoc) and women 
economic rights (wecon). 
 
est1 est2 est3 est4 est5 est6 
  
Share of 
urban pop 
Democracy 
Corruption 
perception 
Gov. educ. 
expenditure 
Ethnic frac. 
Wosoc C1: 
Individual 
      
1.wosoc 0.397* 0.227 0.358+ 0.365 -0.435+ 0.322+ 
 
(2.16) (1.27) (1.87) (1.27) (-1.85) (1.73) 
2.wosoc 1.160*** 0.999*** 1.135*** 1.468*** 0.316 0.802*** 
 
(5.39) (4.61) (5.22) (4.46) (1.18) (3.47) 
3.wosoc 0.094 0.336 0.043 1.323** 0.007 -0.226 
 (0.31) (1.11) (0.14) (3.26) (0.02) (-0.71) 
Wecon C1: 
Individual 
      
1.wecon 0.819*** 0.624***  0.996*** 0.011 0.539** 
 (4.59) (3.49)  (4.90) (0.05) (2.89) 
2. wecon 1.356*** 0.933***  1.824*** 0.258 1.105*** 
 (7.03) (4.53)  (7.71) (1.07) (5.41) 
3. wecon -0.028 -0.330  1.154*** -0.402 -0.210 
 
(-0.09) (-1.09)  (3.44) (-1.26) (-0.70) 
Note: Coefficients from ZINB estimation, t-statistics in parenthesis. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001. For missing entries the estimation process did not converge. 
 
In summary, we find that if gender equality is approximated with measures of education, 
labour market or political participation, most estimates point to a negative relation 
between gender equality and vulnerability. Countries in which women participate more 
evenly in live face lower disaster fatalities in the face of climate related hazards. If, 
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alternatively, expert coded measures of women’s rights are used, the results are more 
ambiguous and might even indicate that societies with more rights for women face more 
disaster fatalities and thus have higher vulnerability.  
 
5.2 Income inequality 
The income distribution is measured with the Gini coefficient of net and market incomes. 
The estimation coefficients of the Gini of net incomes are depicted in Table 22. All 
coefficients are significantly positive (p<.001). The same holds true for the Gini of 
market incomes. Respective estimation results are presented in Table 23, all estimated 
coefficients are positive and highly significant.  
A higher Gini coefficient implies a higher income concentration. Accordingly, there is 
strong evidence that a more unequal distribution of incomes increases a country’s 
vulnerability, i.e. increases the number of disaster fatalities.  
 
Table 22. Coefficients for the Gini of net incomes (gini_net). 
 
est1 est2 est3 est4 est5 est6 
  
Share of 
urban pop 
Democracy 
Corruption 
perception 
Gov. educ. 
expenditure 
Ethnic frac. 
C1: Individual       
Gini net 0.069*** 0.050*** 0.069*** 0.063*** 0.041*** 0.069*** 
 
(8.03) (5.74) (7.91) (4.00) (4.07) (7.83) 
C2: Cumulative       
Gini net 0.069*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.053*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 
 
(8.03) (5.74) (5.85) (3.60) (4.28) (4.25) 
C3: +rule of law       
Gini net 0.069*** 0.071*** 0.073*** 0.101*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 
 
(5.27) (5.34) (5.50) (6.43) (4.63) (4.62) 
Note: Coefficients from ZINB estimation, t-statistics in parenthesis. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001. For missing entries the estimation process did not converge. 
 
Table 23. Coefficients for the Gini of market incomes (gini_market). 
 
est1 est2 est3 est4 est5 est6 
  
Share of 
urban pop 
Democracy 
Corruption 
perception 
Gov. educ. 
expenditure 
Ethnic frac. 
C1: Individual       
Gini market 0.047*** 0.038*** 0.047*** 0.055*** 0.031** 0.041*** 
 
(5.08) (4.41) (4.97) (4.12) (3.14) (4.27) 
C2: Cumulative       
Gini market 0.047*** 0.038*** 0.040*** 0.055*** 0.049*** 0.051*** 
 
(5.08) (4.41) (4.61) (4.41) (3.88) (3.99) 
C3: +rule of law       
Gini market 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.074*** 0.055*** 0.056*** 
 
(4.98) (4.98) (5.04) (5.34) (3.55) (3.65) 
Note: Coefficients from ZINB estimation, t-statistics in parenthesis. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001. For missing entries the estimation process did not converge. 
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So far gender equality and income distribution have been analysed separately. But social 
(in)equalities comprises both distributional aspects and thus will be considered jointly in 
the following subsection.  
 
5.3 Social inequality: gender and income inequality 
Table 24 depicts the estimation coefficients resulting from jointly including the Gini of 
net incomes and the female to male primary and secondary education enrolment ratio 
and its square in the specifications of the main set. The coefficient for Gini-net is 
significantly positive in all estimations. For the gender ratio in education participation 
again a u-shape relation emerges. Estimates are throughout negative and significant for 
half of the specifications. For configuration 3 (C3) the coefficients for education 
participation are all insignificant while the Gini of net incomes remains highly significant. 
 
Table 24. Coefficients for the Gini of net incomes (gini_net) and female/male enrolment 
ration in primary and secondary education (ratio_prim_sec). 
 
est1 est2 est3 est4 est5 est6 
  
Share of 
urban pop 
Democracy 
Corruption 
perception 
Gov. educ. 
expenditure 
Ethnic frac. 
C1: Individual       
Gini net 0.067*** 0.054*** 0.058*** 0.067*** 0.053*** 0.065*** 
 (6.08) (5.14) (4.86) (4.63) (4.07) (5.72) 
Prime-sec ratio -0.508*** -0.371*** -0.440*** -1.350*** -0.261 -0.566*** 
 (-4.06) (-3.49) (-3.45) (-5.20) (-1.59) (-4.15) 
Squared ratio 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.008*** 0.002+ 0.003*** 
 (4.43) (3.66) (3.69) (5.51) (1.72) (4.52) 
C2: Cumulative       
Gini net 0.067*** 0.054*** 0.047*** 0.041** 0.037* 0.038* 
 (6.08) (5.14) (4.12) (2.71) (2.34) (2.41) 
Prime-sec ratio -0.508*** -0.371*** -0.324** -0.771** -0.178 -0.195 
 (-4.06) (-3.49) (-3.00) (-2.83) (-0.55) (-0.60) 
Squared ratio 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.004** 0.001 0.001 
 (4.43) (3.66) (3.08) (2.96) (0.74) (0.79) 
C3: +rule of law       
Gini net 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.041** 0.044** 0.049* 0.049* 
 (3.81) (3.76) (2.64) (2.59) (2.46) (2.47) 
Prime-sec ratio -0.261 -0.250 -0.232 -0.234 -0.051 -0.077 
 (-1.48) (-1.43) (-1.35) (-1.01) (-0.17) (-0.26) 
Squared ratio 0.002+ 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (1.69) (1.62) (1.47) (1.18) (0.45) (0.54) 
Note: Coefficients from ZINB estimation, t-statistics in parenthesis. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001. For missing entries the estimation process did not converge. 
 
Results for female labour force participation and the Gini of net incomes are presented in 
Table 25. The estimates for both measures are significant throughout with the expected 
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positive sign for Gini net and negative sign for female labour force participation. A higher 
concentration of incomes significantly increases and a higher participation of women in 
the labour force significantly decreases total death from disasters. Given that these 
measures are a good approximation of social inequality, these are the strongest results 
so far indicating that more socially equal societies experience less fatalities when 
disasters strike, i.e. more equal societies are less vulnerable.   
 
Table 25. Coefficients for the Gini of net incomes (gini_net) and the share of women in 
the labour force (female_lfp). 
 
est1 est2 est3 est4 est5 est6 
  
Share of 
urban pop 
Democracy 
Corruption 
perception 
Gov. educ. 
expenditure 
Ethnic frac. 
C1: Individual       
Gini net 0.051*** 0.037*** 0.050*** 0.042* 0.029** 0.054*** 
 (5.31) (4.24) (5.02) (2.45) (2.98) (5.58) 
Female lfp -0.049*** -0.041*** -0.051*** -0.052** -0.047*** -0.043*** 
 (-4.34) (-4.23) (-4.43) (-2.73) (-4.70) (-3.85) 
C2: Cumulative       
Gini net 0.051*** 0.037*** 0.039*** 0.039** 0.041** 0.041** 
 (5.31) (4.24) (4.34) (2.62) (2.99) (2.97) 
Female lfp -0.049*** -0.041*** -0.039*** -0.047** -0.056** -0.056** 
 (-4.34) (-4.23) (-4.02) (-2.76) (-3.13) (-3.13) 
C3: +rule of law       
Gini net 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.070*** 0.051** 0.051** 
 (4.17) (4.18) (4.32) (4.23) (2.89) (2.91) 
Female lfp -0.072*** -0.071*** -0.069*** -0.088*** -0.077*** -0.077*** 
 (-4.69) (-4.64) (-4.50) (-4.49) (-3.53) (-3.55) 
Note: Coefficients from ZINB estimation, t-statistics in parenthesis. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001. For missing entries the estimation process did not converge. 
 
The final results of the main set presented in some detail are the coefficients from a joint 
estimation of female members of parliament and the Gini of net incomes, shown in Table 
26. The coefficients for the income distribution are again positive and highly significant 
for all estimations. The estimation coefficient for female_mp is negative for all but two 
specifications. They are statistically significant for configuration 3 (C3) and specification 
5 and 6 (est5, est6) of configuration 2. Results for C3 could imply that there is some 
important interdependency between the rule of law and female political participation. For 
example it could be hypothesized that more equal gender rights in politics can only 
reduce vulnerability in societies where the rule of law is effectively implemented. Since 
the female_mp coefficients are also significant for the most extensive specification of C2 
also a sample effect is a valid explanation: the share of female members of parliament is 
significantly related to total disaster fatalities in the subset of countries with most 
extensive data coverage. 
The estimation results for the combination of Gini net with female-male enrolment ratios 
for primary, secondary and tertiary education in general confirm the results. The 
coefficients for the Gini of net incomes are consistently significantly positive. And the 
coefficients for the enrolment ratios are qualitatively similar to those estimates obtained 
from individual estimation.  The same hold true for Gini net estimated with the different 
CIRI variables on women’s rights. Gini-net-coefficients are consistently significantly 
positive and women’s rights have rather ambiguous results.  
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Table 26. Coefficients for the Gini of net incomes (gini_net) and the female share of 
members of parliament (female_mp). 
 
est1 est2 est3 est4 est5 est6 
  
Share of 
urban pop 
Democracy 
Corruption 
perception 
Gov. educ. 
expenditure 
Ethnic frac. 
C1: Individual       
gini_net 0.113*** 0.087*** 0.112*** 0.068*** 0.056*** 0.111*** 
 (9.89) (7.40) (9.88) (3.87) (4.69) (9.49) 
female_mp -0.004 -0.018+ -0.004 0.013 -0.012 0.002 
 (-0.43) (-1.83) (-0.43) (1.11) (-1.27) (0.16) 
C2: Cumulative       
gini_net 0.113*** 0.087*** 0.085*** 0.056*** 0.051*** 0.049*** 
 (9.89) (7.40) (7.35) (3.39) (3.51) (3.36) 
female_mp -0.004 -0.018+ -0.019+ -0.001 -0.028* -0.029* 
 (-0.43) (-1.83) (-1.92) (-0.10) (-2.44) (-2.48) 
C3: +rule of law       
gini_net 0.085*** 0.084*** 0.087*** 0.106*** 0.066*** 0.065*** 
 (5.86) (5.78) (6.11) (6.47) (3.63) (3.54) 
female_mp -0.026* -0.027* -0.030** -0.034** -0.033* -0.033* 
 (-2.35) (-2.37) (-2.59) (-2.69) (-2.56) (-2.51) 
Note: Coefficients from ZINB estimation, t-statistics in parenthesis. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001. For missing entries the estimation process did not converge. 
 
If the distribution of market incomes is used instead of the distribution of net incomes, 
results are qualitatively unchanged. The significance levels are a bit lower is some 
instances, but estimated coefficients are positive throughout.  
In our reading, this results provide some evidence that the distribution of income and 
equal participation of men and women in society as expression of gender equality are 
both important determinants of a societies vulnerability to extreme weather events and 
thus ultimately their resilience.  
For the distribution of incomes, the measurement of which is comparatively 
unproblematic, this holds in general. For gender equality, this interpretation might need 
qualification, contingent on what variables are considered suitable proxies. For some 
measures of gender equality the evidence is ambiguous in the sense that estimated 
coefficients are insignificant or even have the wrong sign. This is especially the case for 
the CIRI measures of women’s rights. Respective estimation results seem to indicate 
that more rights for women increase disaster fatalities. In order to evaluate these 
counter-intuitive results and assure robustness of the more intuitive findings, attention is 
now directed toward some extensive robustness tests. 
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6. Robustness Checks 
 
The results laid out in the last chapter are derived from specifications which are based 
on sound arguments but which are still somewhat arbitrary. Should the dependent 
variable, counting the total death toll, be included in levels (as done so far) or in logs? 
Should the controls for the area, the population and the per capita GDP be included in 
logs (as done so far) or in levels? Should year effects be included in the explanation of 
fatalities or in the explanation of zeros in the first step or not at all? Do the results hold 
up for a sample of high or low income countries only? Is the prevalence of poverty 
maybe more important than the distribution and concentration of incomes? 
To answer these questions a series of robustness checks are performed by adding or 
changing features of the main set. The respective change is undertaken for the whole set 
and all eighteen modified specifications are re-estimated. After shortly explaining the 
applied modifications the results will be presented in a highly aggregated fashion. It will 
especially be pointed out if and when a modification qualitatively changes the estimation 
coefficients as compared to the main set so that the conclusions of the result section 
have to be reassessed. 
As a first step the specifications in the main set are modified so as to account for 
clustering at the country level (1), i.e. correlation among observations of a given county. 
Thus we obtain robust standard errors which are considerable higher than non-robust 
standard errors. Alternatively, we include year dummies in the second step estimation 
(2) to account for all unobserved year-specific variation. As a third modification the 
permanent control variables area, population and per capita GDP are included in levels 
and not in logs (3). In a fourth step the main set is used in its original specification but 
only on subsets of counties. Results are estimated for three different samples: OECD + 
non-OECD high income countries (4), high middle income countries (5) and low and low 
middle income countries (6).  
Then the question whether the poverty rate rather than the income distribution might be 
a driving force is examined. The WDI data contains poverty data only for a subset of 
counties and years. For these countries also a Gini coefficient of the income distribution 
is available (gini_wb). To account for possible sample selection effects all specifications 
from the main set are estimated on this reduced sample with available poverty data (7), 
the World Bank sample. To assure robustness of the results with respect to the income 
distribution, the Gini of net incomes (gini_net) in the main set is substituted with the 
Gini coefficient provided by the World Bank (gini_wb) (8). To understand the effect of 
poverty, a measure of the poverty-gap (poverty) is added to all specifications containing 
a measure of the income distribution (9). This exercise is repeated using the poverty 
head count ratio (poverty_ratio) instead (10). 
So far the first step selection function explaining the zero observation of death counts 
only included the number of occurrences of the different disasters. To assure that results 
are not driven by the choice of the selection function the log of per capita GDP (11), the 
country area (12) and the latitude of a countries capital (13) are included in turn.  
A final robustness check concerns the specification of the dependent variable. So far the 
count of disaster fatalities has been included in levels. While there is no obvious 
argument why the dependent variables should be included in logs, there are examples in 
the literature where it is done so (Kahn 2005). Accordingly, the main set is re-estimated 
using the log of total disaster death plus one (14).15 This modified version of the main 
set is then again estimated with standard errors robust to clustering at the country level 
(15) and with year fixed effects (16). 
                                           
15 Since the log of zero is not defined, one additional fatality is added to all observations. 
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The following tables show aggregate results for all this robustness tests. No formal 
aggregation procedure has been employed to aggregate the eighteen estimation results 
underlying each set. The algebraic sign and the stars indicate the tendency and in some 
cases bandwidth of obtained estimation results. In case of multiple signs, the first sign is 
in general the more common one within the estimated set.  
The second line of each cell compares how the aggregated results from each respective 
set compare to the results obtained from the main set (summarized in line three of each 
table). The employed tokens mean: 
(√) similar or better results than main set 
(Թ ) worse results than main set but basic hypothesis not challenged 
(†) results potentially could challenge basic hypothesis 
The basic hypothesis referred to and the benchmark of valuation is the hypothesis that 
more equal societies have fewer disaster fatalities. In this sense “better” results imply 
stronger empirical evidence for the basic hypothesis than provided by the estimations in 
the main set. 
In Table 27 the robustness checks for equality in female labour market and education 
participation are summarized. For tertiary education the hypothesis was rejected already 
in the main set, a conclusion not changed by the robustness tests. Estimates for primary 
enrolment ratios remain ambiguous, those for enrolment ratios in secondary education 
remain strong. There is however some indication that in middle income countries 
equality in education enrolment is not important for vulnerability (see (5)). Results for 
female labour force participation are robust to most modifications. (Only the rather small 
sample for middle income countries and the formulation with log-dependent variable and 
year dummies question the negative statistical relation between more gender equality in 
labour market participation and lower disaster fatalities.) 
 
Table 27. Robustness checks, female labour market and education participation.  
 
enrolment 
ratio 
primary 
enrolment 
ratio 
secondary 
enrolment 
ratio 
tertiary 
enrolment 
ratio prim. 
& sec. 
Female lfp 
Main Set -*/+ -*** + -** -*** 
+ clustering at 
country level (1) 
+/- 
(Թ ) 
-**/- 
(Թ ) 
+ 
(√) 
-*/- 
(Թ ) 
-* 
(Թ ) 
+ year dummies (2) 
+*/- 
(†) 
-***, +/- 
(Թ ) 
+ 
(√) 
- 
(Թ ) 
-***/- 
(Թ ) 
non-log area, 
population, pc-gdp (3) 
-***/+ 
(Թ ) 
-***/- 
(Թ ) 
-***/+** 
(√,Թ ) 
-***/- 
(√) 
-*** 
(√) 
Sub-samples 
     
High income 
sample (4) 
- 
(√) 
-***, +/- 
(Թ ) 
- 
(√) 
-***,+ 
(Թ ) 
-*** 
(√) 
Middle income 
sample (5) 
+ 
(†) 
+ 
(†) 
- 
(√) 
+/- 
(Թ ) 
-/+ 
(†) 
Low income 
sample (6) 
-*** 
(√) 
-*** 
(√) 
-, +/- 
(√) 
-** 
(√) 
-*** 
(√) 
World Bank 
Sample (7) 
-* 
(√) 
-***/- 
(Թ ) 
+** 
(†) 
-** 
(√) 
-*** 
(√) 
gini-wb (8) X X X 
-*** 
(√) 
-*** 
(√) 
+ poverty gap (9) X X X X X 
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+ poverty head count 
ratio (10) 
X X X X X 
modified selection 
function      
+ log pc GDP (11) 
-***/+ 
(√) 
-** 
(Թ ) 
+ 
(√) 
-*** 
(√) 
-*** 
(√) 
+ area (12) 
-***/+ 
(√) 
-*** 
(√) 
+*/+ 
(†) 
-*** 
(√) 
-*** 
(√) 
+ latitude (13) 
-***/+ 
(√) 
-*** 
(√) 
+*/+ 
(†) 
-*** 
(√) 
-*** 
(√) 
log(totdeath+1) (14) 
+/- 
(Թ ) 
-*, +/- 
(Թ ) 
+ 
(√) 
-/+ 
(Թ ) 
-** 
(Թ ) 
+ clustering at 
country level (15) 
+/- 
(Թ ) 
-*, +/- 
(Թ ) 
+ 
(√) 
-/+ 
(Թ ) 
-** 
(Թ ) 
+ year dummies (16) 
+/- 
(Թ ) 
-*, +/- 
(Թ ) 
+ 
(√) 
-/+ 
(Թ ) 
-**, + 
(†) 
 
Table 28 depicts the overview over robustness checks for women’s rights and political 
participation. The results from the CIRI variables have been ambiguous or even opposing 
the basic hypothesis. For women’s political rights robustness checks produce very 
ambiguous results, so that we conclude that there is no statistical evidence in this 
variable. For women’s social rights many robustness results oppose the basic hypothesis. 
If however the dependent variable is used in logs (14, 15, 16), results are in line with 
the basic hypothesis. The robustness results for women’s economic rights are in general 
more supportive of the basic hypothesis than the results from the main set. Still, there is 
a lot of ambiguity. Finally, for the share of female members of parliament the basic 
hypothesis is generally supported with some ambiguity. This provides some evidence for 
the importance of equality in political participation for vulnerability. 
In Table 29 the robustness checks of the individual effects of the income distribution are 
show. The results for both, the Gini of net and the Gini of market incomes are robust and 
provide strong evidence for a positive effect of more equality on less disaster fatalities 
and accordingly less vulnerability, throughout. 
 
Table 28. Robustness checks, female political participation and women’s rights. 
 
female_mp wopol wosoc wecon 
Main Set -***, + +*, - +*, - +*, - 
+ clustering at 
country level (1) 
-* 
(√) 
+/- 
(√) 
+/- 
(√) 
+/- 
(√) 
+ year dummies (2) 
-*, + 
(Թ ) 
+/- 
(√) 
+/-, -* 
(√) 
-* 
(√) 
non-log area, 
population, pc-gdp (3) 
-*** 
(√) 
-*, + 
(√) 
-***, + 
(√) 
-** 
(√) 
Sub-samples 
    
High income 
sample (4) 
-*** 
(√) 
+/- 
(√) 
+/-, -* 
(√) 
-* 
(√) 
Middle income 
sample (5) 
-/+ 
(Թ ) 
+/- 
(√) 
+/- 
(√) 
- 
(√) 
Low income 
sample (6) 
-*/+ 
(Թ ) 
-* 
(√) 
+ 
(†) 
+ 
(†) 
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World Bank 
Sample (7) 
-*** 
(√) 
+/- 
(√) 
+* 
(†) 
+*, -* 
(√) 
gini-wb (8) 
-*** 
(√) 
X 
+** 
(†) 
+*, - 
(√) 
+ poverty gap (9) X X X X 
+ poverty head count 
ratio (10) 
X X X X 
modified selection 
function     
+ log pc GDP (11) 
-***, + 
(√) 
+ 
(√) 
+*, -/+ 
(†) 
-**, +* 
(√) 
+ area (12) 
-***, + 
(√) 
+*, -* 
(Թ ) 
+*, -/+ 
(†) 
-*, +* 
(√) 
+ latitude (13) 
-***, + 
(√) 
+*, -* 
(Թ ) 
+*, -/+ 
(†) 
-*, +* 
(√) 
log(totdeath+1) (14) 
-*, + 
(Թ ) 
+/- 
(Թ ) 
-**, + 
(√) 
- 
(√) 
+ clustering at 
country level (15) 
- 
(√) 
-*, + 
(√) 
-*, + 
(√) 
-* 
(√) 
+ year dummies (16) 
-, + 
(Թ ) 
-*, + 
(√) 
-* 
(√) 
- (p<.1) 
(√) 
 
 
Table 29. Robustness checks, income distribution. 
 
Gini of net incomes Gini of Gross incomes 
Main Set +*** +*** 
+ clustering at country 
level (1) 
+* 
(Թ ) 
+* 
(Թ ) 
+ year dummies (2) 
+** 
(Թ ) 
+*, + 
(Թ ) 
non-log area, 
population, pc-gdp (3) 
+*, - 
(Թ ) 
-*, +* 
Sub-samples 
  
High income 
sample (4) 
+***, - 
(Թ ) 
+/- 
(Թ ) 
Middle income 
sample (5) 
+* 
(Թ ) 
+**, - 
(†) 
Low income 
sample (6) 
+*** 
(√) 
+**, + 
(Թ ) 
World Bank 
Sample (7) 
+*** 
(√) 
+** 
(Թ ) 
gini-wb (8) X X 
+ poverty gap (9) 
+*** 
(√) 
+*** 
(√) 
+ poverty head count 
ratio (10) 
+*** 
(√) 
+*** 
(√) 
modified selection 
function   
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+ log pc GDP (11) 
+*** 
(√) 
+*** 
(√) 
+ area (12) 
+*** 
(√) 
+*** 
(√) 
+ latitude (13) 
+*** 
(√) 
+*** 
(√) 
log(totdeath+1) (14) 
+*** 
(√) 
+* 
(Թ ) 
+ clustering at country 
level (15) 
+** 
(Թ ) 
+* 
(Թ ) 
+ year dummies (16) 
+*** 
(√) 
+* 
(Թ ) 
 
The final two tables, Table 30 and Table 31, contain robustness checks for social 
inequality, i.e. the joint estimation of the effect of gender equality and the income 
distribution. Checking the robustness for income inequality and female education 
participation (ratio_prim_sec), i.e. social inequality I, results for the effect of the income 
distribution are confirmed in almost all cases. Also the conclusion for female education 
participation finds mostly support. Only for middle income countries and the use of the 
dependent variable in logs results are ambiguous. Looking at social inequality II (income 
distribution and female labour market participation), results for Gini net are by and large 
robust. Similarly to social inequality I, the effect of the  
 
Table 30. Robustness checks, social inequality I, II. 
 Social inequality I Social inequality II 
 
Gini net 
Ratio prim. 
sec. 
Gini net Female lfp 
Main Set +*** -***, - +** -** 
+ clustering at 
country level (1) 
+* 
(Թ ) 
- 
(Թ ) 
+* 
(Թ ) 
-* 
(Թ ) 
+ year dummies (2) 
+*** 
(√) 
+/- 
(Թ ) 
+** 
(√) 
-***, - 
(Թ ) 
non-log area, 
population, pc-gdp (3) 
+***, - 
(†) 
-***, - 
(√) 
+***, - 
(†) 
-*** 
(√) 
Sub-samples 
    
High income 
sample (4) 
+*, - 
(†) 
+/- 
(Թ ) 
+/-, -* 
(†) 
-*** 
(√) 
Middle income 
sample (5) 
+* 
(Թ ) 
+, - 
(†) 
+** 
(√) 
-*, +/- 
(Թ ) 
Low income 
sample (6) 
+** 
(Թ ) 
- 
(Թ ) 
+**, - 
(†) 
-** 
(√) 
World Bank 
Sample (7) 
X X X X 
gini-wb (8) 
+**  
(gini-wb) 
X 
+***  
(gini-wb) 
X 
+ poverty gap (9) 
+***  
(gini-wb) 
X 
+**  
(gini-wb) 
X 
+ poverty head count 
ratio (10) 
+***, + 
(gini-wb) 
X 
+***  
(gini-wb) 
X 
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modified selection 
function     
+ log pc GDP (11) 
+*** 
(√) 
-***, - 
(√) 
+*** 
(√) 
-*** 
(√) 
+ area (12) 
+*** 
(√) 
-***, - 
(√) 
+*** 
(√) 
-*** 
(√) 
+ latitude (13) 
+*** 
(√) 
-***, - 
(√) 
+*** 
(√) 
-*** 
(√) 
log(totdeath+1) (14) 
+* 
(Թ ) 
-/+ 
(†) 
+*** 
(√) 
- 
(Թ ) 
+ clustering at 
country level (15) 
+* 
(Թ ) 
-/+ 
(†) 
+** 
(√) 
- 
(Թ ) 
+ year dummies (16) 
+** 
(Թ ) 
+/- 
(†) 
+*** 
(√) 
- 
(Թ ) 
 
income distribution is ambiguous only in high-income countries. Robustness results for 
female labour force participation are sometimes a bit weaker than in the main set but 
never question the conclusion drawn and thus overall provide considerable evidence for 
the basic hypothesis. For social inequality III, summarized in Table 31, the results for 
the income distribution are reaffirmed. The evidence for the share of female members of 
parliament, which was ambiguous already in the main set, is not considerably 
strengthened by the robustness exercise. Four out of twelve estimation  
 
Table 31. Robustness checks, social inequality III, IV 
 Social inequality III Social inequality IV 
 
Gini net Female MP Gini net wecon 
Main Set +*** -*, + +*** +*, -* 
+ clustering at 
country level (1) 
+*** 
(√) 
+/- 
(†) 
+* 
(Թ ) 
-*, +/- 
(√) 
+ year dummies (2) 
+*** 
(√) 
+/- 
(†) 
+*, - 
(†) 
+*, -* 
(√) 
non-log area, 
population, pc-gdp (3) 
+*** 
(√) 
-**, + 
(√) 
+*** 
(√) 
-** 
(√) 
Sub-samples 
    
High income 
sample (4) 
+***, - 
(†) 
- 
(√) 
+***, - 
(†) 
+/- 
(Թ ) 
Middle income 
sample (5) 
+*** 
(√) 
-**, + 
(√) 
+*** 
(√) 
+/- 
(Թ ) 
Low income 
sample (6) 
+*** 
(√) 
+/- 
(†) 
-, + 
(†) 
+/- 
(Թ ) 
World Bank 
Sample (7) 
X X X X 
gini-wb (8) 
+**  
(gini-wb) 
X 
+***  
(gini-wb) 
X 
+ poverty gap (9) 
+***  
(gini-wb) 
X 
+**  
(gini-wb) 
X 
+ poverty head count 
ratio (10) 
+***, + 
(gini-wb) 
X 
+***  
(gini-wb) 
X 
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modified selection 
function     
+ log pc GDP (11) 
+*** 
(√) 
-*, + 
(√) 
+*** 
(√) 
+*, -* 
(√) 
+ area (12) 
+*** 
(√) 
-*, + 
(√) 
+*** 
(√) 
+*, -* 
(√) 
+ latitude (13) 
+*** 
(√) 
+/- 
(†) 
+*** 
(√) 
+*, -* 
(√) 
log(totdeath+1) (14) 
+** 
(Թ ) 
-*, + 
(√) 
+*** 
(√) 
-*,+ 
(√) 
+ clustering at 
country level (15) 
+**, + 
(Թ ) 
-, + 
(Թ ) 
+** 
(Թ ) 
- 
(√) 
+ year dummies (16) 
+*** 
(√) 
-/+ 
(Թ ) 
+** 
(Թ ) 
-*, + 
(√) 
 
sets cast doubt on the basic hypothesis. In the context of social inequality there is thus 
only weak evidence that equal gender participation in the political arena is a driving 
factor of vulnerability. In the context of social inequality IV the effect of the income 
distribution is mostly robust. For high income and low income countries as well as for the 
estimation set with year dummies a few results opposing the basic hypothesis are 
obtained. The robustness test for women’s economic rights are in general more positive 
than the main results. However, overall results are highly ambiguous and do not provide 
evidence that gender equality as measured by this variable has a significant effect on 
disaster fatalities and vulnerability. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
This technical report will now be concluded by first summarizing the main results from 
the empirical exercise. Then a number of caveats related to the quantitative analysis will 
be discusses. Thirdly, there will be some reflections on mechanism that could account for 
observed empirical phenomena and related open questions inviting future research. 
 
7.1 Summary of results 
While the measurement of the distribution of incomes is a non-trivial task, income 
inequality is conceptually rather well defined. In contrast, there are a considerable 
number of conceptual problems associated with the measurement of gender equality. In 
the present study gender equality and the (in-) equality of the distribution of incomes 
are defined as jointly determining social inequality. The multiplicity of empirical proxies 
for gender equality and a wide variety of estimation results contingent on the specific 
variable used, make a very concise summary of results difficult.  
There is unequivocal, strong evidence of a significant statistical relation between lower 
fatalities from climate related disasters and more equality for the distribution of income, 
female labour force participation and female participation in secondary education. This 
holds true independent whether only gender equality, equality of the income distribution 
or a combination of both are considered. 
For female participation in primary education and the share of female members of 
parliament there is some indication of a statistical relation between more gender equality 
and lower numbers of disaster fatalities. This is also true if analysed jointly with the 
distribution of incomes, for which the effect is always observable. 
For women’s political, social and economic rights, captured by expert-coded, ordinal 
variables provided in the CIRI dataset no consistent effect can be isolated. A 
considerable number of estimates even indicate that more extensive rights for women 
increase the probability of more disaster fatalities. This finding however is not robust to 
specification and sample modifications. The same is true for female participation in 
tertiary education, there are also a number of positive and many ambiguous estimates. 
Why gender inequality in tertiary education does not contribute to vulnerability in the 
same way as secondary education does, remains an open question in need of further 
research. The results obtained for women’s rights as captured in the CIRI variables 
however are rejected by the authors. These results might be driven by coding choices 
and a lack of variability in the data. 
 
7.2 Caveats of the quantitative analysis 
The analysis has produced a number of clear cut results which can be used for policy 
recommendations. However, there are a number of caveats that have to be taken into 
account when interpreting this results (as with most empirical findings in economics). 
Problems arise form data quality, the chosen macro perspective, the challenge to 
establish causation and specification search.  
The question of what constitutes the proper empirical model and the search for the 
correct specification are central methodological problems in econometrics. Underlying 
assumptions, test statistics and goodness of fit measures provide some guidance, 
especially for the selection of the appropriate estimation method. There is however no 
method for determining the appropriate set of control variables and specification 
selection seems to be a wide-spread phenomenon, also in the top peer-reviewed 
journals (Brodeur et al. 2013). We employed a multiple specification approach and 
extensive robustness checks to make the issue of specification choice transparent. At the 
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same time these multiple estimates showed how strongly estimation coefficients of 
interest can depend on the choice of control variables.  
It is also important to keep in mind that the present analysis can only establish 
statistical relations and does not provide proof of an underlying causal relationship. In 
addition there are a number of endogeneity issues which are not addressed explicitly: 
The log of per capita GDP in PPP is included in all specifications since socio-economic 
development is an established and important determinant of vulnerability. At the same 
time female empowerment and increasing gender equality are strongly related to the 
level of development, albeit the direction of the causal link is debated (e.g. Doepke et al. 
2012, Duflo 2011, Fernández 2014). Accordingly, the estimates for gender equality 
might suffer from endogeneity bias. The fact that the occurrence of a climate related 
extreme weather event can potentially have an influence on the distribution of income 
and wealth (Miljkovic and Miljkovic 2014, Park et al. 2015) provides a second potential 
source of endogeneity. 
The choice of countries as units of observations entails further problems. Countries can 
entail considerable variability in the geographical distribution of income concentration 
and vulnerability. Since extreme weather events are often events at the local level, a lot 
of within-subject heterogeneity is not used. A more detailed understanding of the 
phenomenon at hand is difficult since a lot of interactions might be averaged out.  
Finally the data quality has to be considered. Potential and actual shortcomings of the 
data have been exhaustively discussed in Section 2. Possibly systematic bias in the 
disaster data is mitigated by some robustness checks, especially separate estimations 
for different country groups sorted by income. For a lack of variability and the probability 
of biased coding in the CIRI data there is however little remedy. On top of that there is 
the general problem that countries might strategically falsify their economic data. 
Michalski and Stolz (2013) provide evidence for that. Since the data selection for this 
study followed the peer-reviewed academic literature, data problems can be considered 
near universal and should be borne in mind.     
 
7.3 Possible explanations and future research 
The present study shows that some forms of inequality have an influence on 
vulnerability and resilience of countries. To establish this relation the problematic 
question of quantifying vulnerability or resilience is sidestepped by looking at disaster 
fatalities, arguably the most negative result from extreme weather events in the context 
of too much vulnerability or too little resilience. We argue that a statistical relation 
between more gender and/or income equality associated with a reduction in the 
probability of high numbers of disaster fatalities provide indirect evidence for a reduction 
in vulnerability. But what is the underlying mechanism, i.e. why should inequality 
increase vulnerability or decrease system resilience?16 
We propose a sketch of a theory for this relation. However, the mechanisms proposed 
need further elaboration and more empirical scrutiny in future research. 
A high capacity to cope increases a country’s resilience and decreases its vulnerability. 
The capacity to cope in turn depends on (or is produced with) a number of inputs, most 
notably available resources, good institutions and high levels of social cooperation. 17 
Some, maybe most of the resources used will be public goods or have similar 
                                           
16 The link between vulnerability and poverty is obvious. But more inequality does not 
necessarily mean more poverty. A high (low) concentration of incomes does not always 
entail more (less) poverty, especially if poverty is measured in absolute terms.  
17  These inputs are certainly co-dependent: good institutions might allow for more 
widespread cooperation and trust and all of these together will foster development, 
thereby increasing available resources. 
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characteristics (e.g. sea wall, electricity grid, participation in vaccination). The provision 
of public goods entails a social dilemma in the sense that individual rational behaviour 
results in free riding and an under-provision of the public good while mutual cooperation 
would result in a better outcome for (almost) everybody. Cooperation in this sense is a 
successful solution for a social dilemma.  
The propensity and ability to cooperate is directly influenced by the distribution of 
resources (income and wealth) among individuals. The literature however is rather 
ambiguous about the direct effect of inequality on cooperation. Especially theoretical 
contributions predict more contribution in situations of more unequally distributed 
endowments (Bergstrom et al. 1986, Chan et al. 1996). Experiments however often find 
the inverse effect of lower levels of cooperation under more concentrated distributions of 
endowments (Anderson et al. 2008, Cardenas 2003, Cardenas 2007, Cherry et al. 2005, 
Tavoni et al. 2011, Gaechter et al. 2014). The net effect of inequality seems to depend 
on a number of other factors (Chan et al. 1999). 
But there is also an indirect effect of inequality on cooperation. Higher levels of wealth 
and income inequality make people more dissimilar and less trusting (Gustavsson and 
Jordahl 2008, Leigh 2006). Trust is thus an important determinant of cooperation and 
lower levels of trust due to more inequality result in lower levels of cooperation (Balliet 
and Van Lange 2013). Less cooperation reduces resilience and the capacity to cope 
directly and indirectly via a lower provision of public goods. 
In the case of gender equality the direct effects of inequality on trust and cooperation 
might be less pronounced but could in principle also be present. If more gender equality 
implies that women have more decision power in society, then higher levels of 
cooperation could in addition follow from a generic gender effect. Women are shown to 
be less competitive and have a higher propensity to cooperate than men in some 
circumstances (Niederle and Vesterlund 2011, Balliet et al. 2011). Under conditions of 
more gender equality this might contribute to higher levels of cooperation throughout 
society. Finally, women empowerment is known to be strongly related to socio-economic 
development (Doepke et al. 2012, Duflo 2011, Fernández 2014). While we are 
controlling for per capita GDP, women empowerment might foster other components of 
socio-economic development which are important for a reduction in vulnerability and not 
captured by per capita GDP. 
A detailed understanding of how gender equality and the income distribution affect 
vulnerability is left for future research.      
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Variable Description, CIRI variable on women rights. 
Variable 
(variable 
name) 
Rights entailed Coding 
Women 
political 
rights 
(wopol) 
the right to vote, the right to run for 
political office, the right to hold elected and 
appointed government positions, the right 
to join political parties, the right to petition 
government officials 
(0) There are no X* rights for 
women under law and 
systematic discrimination 
based on sex may be built into 
the law. The gov. tolerates a 
high level of discrimination 
against women. 
(1) There are some X* rights 
for women under law. 
However, in practice, the gov. 
DOES NOT enforce these laws 
effectively or enforcement of 
laws is weak. The gov. 
tolerates a moderate level of 
discrimination against women. 
(2) There are some X* rights 
for women under law. In 
practice, the gov. DOES 
enforce these laws effectively. 
However, the gov. still 
tolerates a low level of 
discrimination against women. 
(3) All or nearly all of women's 
X* rights are guaranteed by 
law. In practice, the gov. fully 
and vigorously enforces these 
laws. The gov. tolerates none 
of almost no discrimination 
against women.  
* X stands for political, 
economic or social 
Women 
economic 
rights 
(wecon) 
equal pay for equal work, free choice of 
profession or employment without the need 
to obtain a husband or male relative's 
consent, the right to gainful employment 
without the need to obtain a husband or 
male relative's consent, equality in hiring 
and promotion practices, job security 
(maternity leave, unemployment benefits, 
no arbitrary firing or layoffs, etc...), non-
discrimination by employers, the right to be 
free from sexual harassment in the 
workplace, the right to work at night, the 
right to work in occupations classified as 
dangerous, the right to work in the military 
and the police force 
Women 
social 
rights 
(wosoc) 
the right to equal inheritance, the right to 
enter into marriage on a basis of equality 
with men, the right to travel abroad, the 
right to obtain a passport, the right to 
confer citizenship to children or a husband, 
the right to initiate a divorce, the right to 
own, acquire, manage, and retain property 
brought into  marriage, the right to 
participate in social, cultural, and 
community activities, the right to an 
education, the freedom to choose a 
residence/domicile, freedom from female 
genital mutilation (FGM) of children and of 
adults without their consent, freedom from 
forced sterilization 
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Table A2. List of countries in the sample. 
Country name    
 Dominican Rep. Libya Vincent & the Grenadine 
Afghanistan Ecuador Lithuania Samoa 
Albania Egypt Luxembourg Sao Tome and Principe 
Algeria El Salvador Macau Saudi Arabia 
American Samoa Eritrea Macedonia Senegal 
Angola Estonia Madagascar Serbia 
Anguilla Ethiopia Malawi Seychelles 
Antigua & Barbuda Fiji Malaysia Sierra Leone 
Argentina Finland Maldives Slovakia 
Armenia France Mali Slovenia 
Australia French Guiana Marshall Islands Solomon Islands 
Austria French Polynesia Martinique Somalia 
Azerbaijan Gabon Mauritania South Africa 
Bahamas Gambia Mauritius South Sudan 
Bangladesh Georgia Mexico Spain 
Barbados Germany Micronesia Sri Lanka 
Belarus Ghana Moldova Sudan 
Belgium Greece Mongolia Suriname 
Belize Grenada Montenegro Swaziland 
Benin Guadeloupe Montserrat Sweden 
Bermuda Guam Morocco Switzerland 
Bhutan Guatemala Mozambique Syria 
Bolivia Guinea Namibia Taiwan 
Bosnia & Herzegovina Guinea-Bissau Nepal Tajikistan 
Botswana Guyana Netherlands Tanzania 
Brazil Haiti New Caledonia Thailand 
Bulgaria Honduras New Zealand Timor-Leste 
Burkina Faso Hong Kong Nicaragua Togo 
Burundi Hungary Niger Tokelau 
Cambodia Iceland Nigeria Tonga 
Cameroon India Niue Trinidad & Tobago 
Canada Indonesia North. Mariana Isl. Tunisia 
Cape Verde Iran Norway Turkey 
Cayman Islands Iraq Oman Turkmenistan 
Central African Rep. Ireland Pakistan Turks and Caicos Islands 
Chad Israel Palau Tuvalu 
Chile Italy Palestine Uganda 
China Jamaica Panama Ukraine 
Colombia Japan Papua New Guinea United Kingdom 
Comoros Jordan Paraguay United States of America 
Congo (Brazzaville) Kazakhstan Peru Uruguay 
Congo (Kinshasa) Kenya Philippines Uzbekistan 
Cook Islands Kiribati Poland Vanuatu 
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Costa Rica Korea, North Portugal Venezuela 
Cote d'Ivoire Korea, South Puerto Rico Vietnam 
Croatia Kuwait Reunion Virgin Islands, Bri. 
Cuba Kyrgyzstan Romania Virgin Islands, U.S. 
Cyprus Laos Russian Federation Wallis & Futuna Isl. 
Czech Republic Latvia Rwanda Yemen 
Denmark Lebanon Saint Helena Zambia 
Djibouti Lesotho Saint Kitts & Nevis Zimbabwe 
Dominica Liberia Saint Lucia  
 
 
 
Map A1. Women political rights (averaged over 1981-2011). 
 
 
Map A2. Women political rights (averaged over 1981-2011). 
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Map A3. Women social rights (averaged over 1981-2007). 
 
 
 
Map A4. Share of women in parliament (average 1990-2014). 
 
 
Map A5. Share of women in the workforce (average 1990-2012). 
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Map A6. Female to male enrolment ratio in primary education (average 1980-2014). 
 
 
 
 
Map A7. Female to male enrolment ratio in secondary education (average 1980-2014). 
 
 
Map A8. Female to male enrolment ratio in tertiary education (average 1980-2014). 
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Map A9. Female to male enrolment ratio in primary and secondary education (average 
1980-2014). 
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List of abbreviations 
 
CC  climate change 
CIRI  Cingranelli Richards (short form for “The CIRI Human Rights Dataset") 
CPI  Corruption Perception Index 
CRED  Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters 
e.g.  for example (short for ‘exempli grata’)  
et al.  and others (short for ‘et alia’) 
i.e.  that is (short for ‘id est’) 
IPCC  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
GDP  gross domestic product 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PPP  purchasing power parity 
QoG  Quality of government dataset 
SIDS  Small islands developing states 
SWIID  Standardized world income inequality dataset  
USSD  United States States Department 
U.S.  United States 
WDI  World Bank Development Indicators 
ZINB  Zero inflated negative binomial model 
ZIP  Zero inflated poisson model 
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